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Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller
and the Abortion Analogue:
Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons,
and the Attitudinalist Critique
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
With close to 300 million guns in the civilian inventory,' and
confirmation of the right to keep and bear arms in District of Columbia v.
Heller,2 the United States is well past the point where firearms supply
restrictions can be effective.3  Nonetheless, proposals for supply
restrictions at the margins of the individual right continue.4 Recent
proposals for renewal of the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban, and the
corresponding market response, suggest that people on both sides of the
issue think Heller might not protect assault weapons.'
Heller established that citizens have a constitutional right to possess
6guns that are in common use for ordinary purposes like self-defense.
Like any first effort, Heller leaves many issues unsettled. The common-
use test might generate either empirical filters or categories of
functionality that could protect guns labeled assault weapons. However,
Heller does not promise that everything nominally protected is always
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. This
Article benefited from the comments and insights of Don B. Kates, Che Kates, David Kopel, Marc
Arkin, Mane Hajdin, John Frazier, and Sanford Levinson. Thanks to George Mocsary for excellent
research and editing.
I. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 843 n.21 (2oo8) (citing GRADUATE INST. OF INT'L STUDIES,
SMALL ARMS SURVEY 2007: GUNS AND THE CITY 47 tbl.2.3 (2007) [hereinafter SMALL ARMS SURVEY]).
2. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791-92 (2008).
3. See Johnson, supra note i, at 838-39.
4. See id.
5. Indications that the Obama administration favors renewal of the 1994 ban, 18 U.S.C. § 922
(2oo6), have fueled a buying panic that has pushed assault weapon sales to record levels. Alex Roth &
Betsy McKay, Fear and Greed Have Sales of Guns and Ammo Shooting Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
2009, at Ai, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123984o46627223159.html; The "Obama
Effect" Brings a Run on Guns and Ammo, TIME, Apr. 27, 2009, at 27.
6. 128 S. Ct. at 2817-18.
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protected. There are many different types of guns, each with distinct
utilities to the user and correspondingly distinct externalities that the
government might want to control. As the majority acknowledged and
dissenters criticized, Heller provides no obvious standard for determining
whether some guns and some circumstances get more protection than
8
others. The assault weapons question prompts the search for an
appropriate standard. What should happen when a state asserts that
assault weapons must be banned because they impose peculiar
externalities and that the ban is constitutional because many other guns
remain available?
We are not working on a blank slate. It is a common problem that
protected rights are exercised in a variety of ways, employing different
methodologies and technologies that raise distinct constitutional
questions. We might employ something like the broad protection granted
to alternative methodologies under the First Amendment.9 It is not just
traditional printing presses, but an endless variety of communications
methodologies that are protected.' On that principle, all guns satisfying
the Heller common-use test might enjoy equally robust protection." The
obvious objection is that guns are different. The gun right poses risks of a
different character and magnitude. We need something that
acknowledges that both the right, and the restriction of it, put human life
in play. On that count, the Court's abortion jurisprudence is uniquely-
suited for building foundation on which to build a standard for resolving
the assault weapons question.
Over a decade ago I argued that there is a broad analytical
intersection between abortion and gun-rights claims. 2 The threshold
analogy is apt because both situations pit the right-claimant against
substantial competing life-interests. I illustrated the intersection
primarily through the work of abortion rights commentators who
repeatedly use self-defense themes to construct the abortion right.'3 That
broad intersection remains. And within it, on the particular question of
7. See id. at 2817.
8. Id. at 2816-17; id. at 2846 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
to. See id. ("[M]otion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live
entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee.").
i i. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. Some will criticize this distinction as more practical and political
than constitutional. Ideally, we might all agree that constitutional rights must be equally protected,
and rhetorically the Court has affirmed this idea. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,484 (1982) ("[W]e know of no principled basis on
which to create a hierarchy of constitutional values .... ").
12. Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions; The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 5o
RUOTGERS L. REV. 97, 98-99 (997). Core arguments from that article are summarized in the text of this
Article. See infra notes 196-221 and accompanying text.
13. Johnson, supra note 12, at 99.
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"partial-birth abortion," there is a compelling analogue to the assault
weapons question.
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Supreme Court engaged an abortion
claim that closely tracks the assault weapons question.'4 Stenberg dealt
with a challenge to Nebraska's partial-birth abortion ban.'" The question
was whether a woman could demand access to a particular abortion
methodology known alternately as dilation and extraction ("D&X") or
intact dilation and evacuation ("intact D&E"). 6 The majority decision,
advanced by the liberal wing of the Court, affirmed a woman's right to
the abortion methodology best suited to protect life and health, even when
lesser but still safe alternatives are available.'7 This, in principle, is the
assault weapons question. Particularly, can the state ban guns that in
some circumstances are the best self-defense options, on the excuse that
other guns remain available?
The Court addressed the partial-birth abortion question again in
Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding a federal ban on the same procedure
protected in Stenberg5 Gonzales was in many ways the conservative's
repudiation of Stenberg. It distinguished but did not overturn Stenberg,
which remains an important model for our purposes.9 The statute in
Gonzales rested on explicit congressional findings that partial-birth
abortion "is never medically necessary."2 Stenberg, in contrast, was
grounded on findings that the contested methodology sometimes was the
best available procedure for preserving the life or health of the mother.2'
This "best available methodology" claim is where the partial-birth
abortion/assault weapons comparison is most apt.
Of equal importance, Stenberg, more so than Gonzales, frames the
attitudinalist critique" that is the subtext of this Article.
14. 530 U.S. 914,920-23 (2o00).
15 . Id. at 921-22.
I6. See id. at 929-3 o . The Nebraska statute contrasted the illegal D&X procedure with the legal
D&E procedure. Id. at 923-29. Subsequently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 16io, 1621 (2oo7), the
term "intact D&E" was used synonymously with D&X.
17. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38.
18. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1619.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 1638 (emphasis added). While the Court did not entirely defer to those findings, its
standards for evaluating those findings make Gonzales a more complicated comparison than Stenberg.
See id. at 1638-39.
21. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937-38.
22. See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and
Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150,
1152-55 (2oo4). Michael Dorf summarizes and brings a degree of skepticism to the attitudinalist
model:
Political scientists who study the Supreme Court do not take legal doctrine very
seriously. According to the leading view of the political scientists-the "attitudinal
model"-the attitudes of individual Justices are a better predictor of how the Court will
resolve contested cases than is the sort of reasoning one finds in briefs and opinions....
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"Attitudinalism," widely endorsed by political scientists, argues that legal
scholars erroneously focus on what justices say to explain and predict the
Court's decisions.23 Attitudinalists argue that this law talk is "worse than
useless."'  They say it is not the words and principles articulated in
published opinions that dictate outcomes, but rather the passions5 that
drive Justices' preferences for particular outcomes that control results.26
Just knowing whether a judge is liberal or conservative, and her general
policy preferences and biases, say attitudinalists, better explains and
predicts her votes than anything written in the United States Reports. 7
Stenberg presents a better test of the attitudinalist critique than
Gonzales. It pits Court liberals' constitutional protection of better
methodologies to protect life or health in the abortion case against their
nascent disparagement of the parallel gun claim through the series of
dissents in Heller-views that prefigure a rejection of arguments that
assault weapons are sometimes the better self-defense tools28 While
Gonzales juxtaposed with Heller presents for the conservative wing
similar tests of principle, those turn out to be quantitatively lighter
burdens. As I show throughout this Article, conservatives could, on a
principled basis, apply Stenberg standards to uphold a claim to better
methodologies in the assault weapons case even after rejecting some of
those same principles in Gonzales. So while both wings of the Court are
exposed to the attitudinalist critique, Court conservatives can more easily
justify their position on points of principle.
... [T]he political scientist employs Occam's razor to dispense with the metaphysical
nonsense of law as a category independent of values, ideology and preferences, at least in
the sorts of hard cases that reach the Supreme Court. Most spectacularly, she can point to
the results of a recent experiment-the "Supreme Court Forecasting Project"-in which a
cousin of the attitudinal model was matched against a battery of legal experts, each of
whom was asked to predict the outcomes of then-pending cases in their respective fields of
expertise: The statistical model correctly predicted the outcome in seventy-five percent of
the cases, while the human team was right in only fifty-nine percent. Thus, armed with her
statistics and regression analyses, the political scientist can dismiss most talk of "law" as
worse than useless.
Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 498-500 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
23. Ruger et al., supra note 22, at 1154.
24. Doff, supra note 22, at 500.
25. I use "passions" here roughly in the sense that James Madison employed to describe the
political interests and connections that generate factions: "By a faction, I understand a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens." THE
FEDERALIST No. to, at 130 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (emphasis added).
26. Doff, supra note 22, at 499-500. This criticism was at the core of my first elaboration of the
"standard position" more than a decade ago. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 99-100.
27. See Doff, supra note 22, at 512-13.
28. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2863-64 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This Article will show how assault weapons might be protected
under Heller as a threshold matter, how Stenberg's guarantee of better
methodologies to protect life or health applies just as easily to the assault
weapons question, and how the response of Court liberals to an assault
weapons case will be an important test of the attitudinalist critique. Part I
will show how the assault weapons question emerged, and position it in
the context of gun-control politics. Part II will show how assault weapons
fit within the category of firearms protected under Heller's common-use
test, and how assault weapons, like all firearms, exhibit special marginal
utilities (SMUs) that make them especially effective in certain categories
of self-defense. Part III will show that the principles rendered in Stenberg
apply just as easily, and sometimes more so, to assault weapons, putting
the liberal wing of the Court to a test of principle that is much tougher to
overcome than the roughly parallel burden that Gonzales poses for
Court conservatives.
I. ASSAULT WEAPONS AND MODERN POLITICS
The first fight is about definitions. Some people still believe the
assault weapons debate is about machine guns.29 This is not surprising
given that proponents of the 1994 ban were counting on precisely that
confusion.3" The calculation was political. Josh Sugarman of the Violence
Policy Center argued in 1989 that the public had lost interest in handgun
control.3' He counseled the anti-gun lobby to switch to the "assault
weapon issue,"3 which they did in 1989 to great success.33 In Sugarman's
words:
Although handguns claim more than 20,000 lives a year, the issue of
handgun restriction consistently remains a non-issue with the vast
majority of legislators, the press, and public.... Assault
weapons ... are a new topic. The weapons' menacing looks, coupled
with the public's confusion over fully automatic machine guns versus
semi-automatic assault weapons-anything that looks like a machine
gun is assumed to be a machine gun-can only increase the chance of
public support for restrictions on these weapons.34
29. For example, every year in my Gun Control seminar, I conduct a survey on the first day of
class. I have always gotten at least one response reflecting the belief that assault weapons are machine
guns.
30. VIOLENCE POLICY CrR., ASSAULT WEAPONS AND AccEssoRs IN AMERICA (1988), available at
www.vpc.org/studies/awacont.htm (follow "Conclusion" hyperlink).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In Re ioI California Street: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of "Assault Weapons," STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV., Winter 1997, at 41, 43.
34. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 30.
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One of the most salient descriptions of this maneuver is actually
quoted by Justice Thomas in his Stenberg dissent.35 Commenting on the
legislative use of technically inaccurate pejoratives to label regulated
activity (e.g., "partial-birth abortion"), Justice Thomas quotes an analysis
of the assault weapons legislation:
Prior to 1989, the term "assault weapon" did not exist in the lexicon of
firearms. It is a political term, developed by anti-gun publicists to
expand the category of "assault rifles" so as to allow an attack on as
many additional firearms as possible on the basis of undefined "evil"
appearance. 6
Steven Halbrook clarifies that after World War II, "assault rifle"
(compare "assault weapon") became a standard military term to describe
a specific type of machine gun:
The official U.S. Department of Defense manual on Communist small
arms states: "Assault rifles are short, compact, selective-fire weapons
[i.e., machineguns] that fire a cartridge intermediate in power between
submachine-gun and rifle cartridges. Assault rifles have mild recoil
characteristics and, because of this, are capable of delivering effective
full automatic fire at ranges up to 300 meters." The usage became so
accepted that the U.S. Supreme Court referred to the American
Armed Forces M-i6 selective fire rifle as the "standard assault rifle.
37
Despite its dubious origin, the assault weapon designation is now a
fixture in the gun-control debate. So while there are disagreements about
what, if anything, constitutes an assault weapon,38 I will use the 1994 ban
classifications to talk about them here. Under that legislation, assault
weapons are principally semiautomatic 39 rifles, with features like pistol
grips, folding stocks, and bayonet lugs, that feed ammunition through a
detachable box magazine (DBM).4°
From a crime-control perspective, the regulation of assault weapons
is mainly symbolic.4 I have demonstrated previously that supply
35. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, toor n.i6 (20o0) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (quoting Kobayashi & Olson, supra note 33, at 43).
37. STEVEN P. HALBROOK, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK: FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL PRACTICE 671
(2008-2009 ed.) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting HAROLD E. JOHNSON, U.S. ARMY
FOREIGN SCI. & TECH. CTR., SMALL ARMS IDENTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS GUIDE-EURASIAN
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 105 (1980)).
38. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 381,386-87 (1994).
39. This means they fire one shot with each pull of the trigger. See Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/semiautomatic (last visited June 10, 2009)
("[Aible to fire repeatedly but requiring release and another pressure of the trigger for each successive
shot.").
40. David Kopel provides a detailed description, along with photographs, of the types of guns
defined as assault weapons under the 1994 ban. See David B. Kopel, "Assault Weapons," in GUNS:
WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? 159, 159-74, 192-203 (David B. Kopel ed., 1995).
41. See Jacob Sullum, Ban Aid: The Real Point of the "Assault Weapon" Law, REASON ONLINE,
May 9, 2003, http://www.reason.com/news/show/3571I.html ("In 1996 Washington Post columnist
(Vol. 6o:1285
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restrictions ranging from one-gun-a-month schemes to flat gun bans
cannot work without a willingness and ability to reduce supply to levels
approaching zero42- an impossible feat in a country with 300 million guns
tightly held by people who think they are uniquely important tools. 43
Internationally, the defiance ratio in places that have attempted
confiscation and registration is 2.6 illegal guns for every legal one.' That
is just the average.4 1 In many countries defiance is far higher.46 And none
of those countries has as deep and entrenched a gun culture as the
United States.47 This remainder problem and defiance impulse mean that
we are far past the point where supply restrictions can work.
Moreover, post-Heller, taking the supply to zero is explicitly
constitutionally prohibited. This means that prospective supply
restrictions on the roughly 1.5% increase in the civilian inventory that
occurs each year 4 - some fraction of which are assault weapons-are
worse than ineffective because they fuel delusions that something
important has happened on the violence policy front. They are worse still
where they amount to pandering by people who understand the problem
well enough to know that restrictions just on certain guns will consume
our energy, but will not reduce gun crime.49 That said, campaigning for
assault weapons bans persists.0
Charles Krauthammer, who favors banning gun possession by civilians, conceded that the arguments
advanced by supporters of the 'assault weapon' ban were 'laughable.' The 'only real justification' for
the law, he said, 'is not to reduce crime but to desensitize the public to the regulation of weapons in
preparation for their ultimate confiscation."').
42. Johnson, supra note I, at 842. It is undeniable that a sealed room with no guns in it will have
no gun crime. That simple idea, extrapolated to society at large, is the impulse for the view that supply
restrictions are the answer to gun crime in America. Id. at 844.
43. See id. at 839.
44. Id. at 853 (citing SMALL ARMS SURVEY, supra note I, at 55).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 853-56.
47. Id. at 855-56.
48. Id. at 848 n.44 (citing COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 73 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds.,
2004)).
49. See, e.g., Sullum, supra note 41. Furthermore, guns used in crime are, by a wide margin,
handguns. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/homicide/tables/weaponstab.htm; see also District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2856-57 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing statistics suggesting
that handguns "appear to be a very popular weapon among criminals"). Handguns are explicitly
constitutionally protected under Heller. See id. at 2821-22 (majority opinion).
5o. The push for renewal of the 1994 ban by the Obama administration has been resisted by the
Senate and House leadership. See J. Taylor Rushing, Reid Joins Pelosi in Opposing Ban Revival,
THEHILLCOM, Feb. 26,2009, http:l/thehil.com/leading-the-news/reid-joins-pelosi-in-opposing-weapons-
ban-revival-2009-o2-26.html.
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I. HELLER'S COMMONLY-OWNED FIREARMS AND THE
SPECTRUM OF SELF-DEFENSE UTILITIES
A. HELLER'S COMMON FIREARMS FOR PRIVATE SELF-DEFENSE
Although Heller has been criticized for failing to resolve all of the
questions that swirl around the newly clarified Second Amendment,' it
does offer a formula for establishing the rough boundaries of protected
firearms." Noting that the Court's previous effort in United States v.
Miller53 focused less on who is protected and more on what weapons are
protected by the Second Amendment, the Heller Court highlights the
problematic results of Miller's suggestion that "only those weapons
useful in warfare are protected."' The Heller majority writes: "We think
that Miller's 'ordinary military equipment' language must be read in
tandem with what comes after: '[O]rdinarily when called for [militia]
service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear bearing arms
supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the
time[]'. . . for lawful purposes like self-defense."55 With this elaboration,
the Court defines the boundaries of constitutionally protected arms.
As a threshold matter, in contrast to the ambiguous implications of
Miller, Heller's common-use formula provides a relatively narrow range
of protection that easily excludes the vast majority of military arms. 6
Excluded by definition are possibilities that, pre-Heller, were snidely
advanced to undercut the individual-rights view-for example, does the
Second Amendment mean you can have tactical nuclear weapons and
stinger missiles?57 By definition, any device that would destroy both the
self-defender and the attacker in situations that satisfy the imminent
threat requirement are outside the envelope. So no, you do not have a
Second Amendment right to a nuke, a howitzer, or a stinger, because
within the boundaries of private self-defense, they would blow you up
too. This does leave room for dispute about fully-automatic infantry
rifles. But as a practical matter that question is essentially settled. The
Court already has said that machine guns might be excluded." They are
51. Much of this criticism is captured by Justice Breyer's dissent. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2869-70
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 2816-17 (majority opinion).
53. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
54. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2815.
55- Id. at 2815 (first, second, and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
56. See id. at 2817 (referencing the "historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous
and unusual weapons"').
57. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Federal Court of Appeals Says the Second Amendment Places
Limits on Gun Control Legislation, FINDLAW.COM, Oct. 31, 2001, http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/dorf/
200t103I.html.
58. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.
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numerically uncommon, 9 have been regulated as an exceptional category
for decades, 60 and introduction of new ones is barred by law.6
So if machine guns can be restricted, what about assault weapons?
Heller suggests criteria for answering at least part of that question. First,• 62
Heller's explicit validation of firearms for self-defense shows that the
visceral reaction some people have to guns that seem built for fighting
rather than sport 63 is no longer a sufficient gauge of legitimacy. Second,
Heller's common self-defense criteria suggests at least two obvious ways
to qualify: A gun might be common because it is widely owned-for
example, a Remington shotgun with sales in the millions." A gun might
also be common because it is functionally the same as other common
guns-for example, a custom-made shotgun that operates just like the
widely-owned Remington.
r. Are Assault Weapons Numerically Common?
Fundamentally, assault weapons are semiautomatic firearms,
distinctions among which border on incoherent." As a type,
59. In 1995 there were over 240,000 automatic weapons registered with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED
IN CRIME 4 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/guic.pdf. About half are owned by
civilians and the other half by police departments and other governmental agencies. GARY KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL io8 (1997).
6o. See, e.g., Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-3o8, oo Stat. 449 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of is and 26 U.S.C.).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 922(0) (2006).
62. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822.
63. A 1994 open letter critical of the Second Amendment published in several national
periodicals is a perfect example. See Albert W. Alschular et al., Does the 2nd Amendment Mean We
Must Tolerate This?, AM. LAWYER, June 1994, at 96. The graphic backdrop of the letter is an
INTRATEC "TEC-9." The TEC-9 is an ugly, menacing-looking gun. The letter suggests that by
appearance alone, without any critique of relative functionality, thoughtful people should all agree
that the TEC-9 is illegitimate. See id. But ironically, from a functional viewpoint, it is an absurdly sub-
optimal gun. Though it is a handgun, it sacrifices the concealability that is the main SMU of the
handgun. Though it is a semiautomatic, it fires not even the intermediate rifle round, but a pistol
round that has less range and less inherent accuracy. GunsLot.com, Intratec TEC-9, http://
www.gunslot.com/guns/intratec-tec-9 (last visited June io, 2009). It is generally unreliable, with
feeding problems being the main difficulty. Id. Because it is extremely heavy for a handgun, it is
difficult to fire accurately and difficult even to hold in firing position. Id. Demonstration of it
compared to most other guns leaves observers wondering what rationale produced the distinction that
labels the shotgun legitimate but stigmatizes the TEC-9. See id.
64. Layne Simpson, Remington's Magnificent Five, SHOOTING TIMES, May 2ooo, available at http://
hunting.about.com/od/guns/l/aastremmag5a.htm; Gary Engberg, America's Shotgun, Buc, i.AsrmRs.coM,
http://www.buckmasters.comfbmlResources/Articles/tabid/h35/articleType/ArticleView/articleld/ 151/
Americas-Shotgun.aspx (last visited June so, 2009).
65. The California Attorney General's chief firearms expert reflected this in his argument for
either banning all semiautomatics or banning none of them. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 403; see also
Nicholas J. Johnson, Shots Across No Man's Land: A Response to Handgun Control, Inc.'s Richard
Aborn, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 441, 445 (1995) (explaining that criminals can switch from banned guns
to acceptable guns that still accept thirty-round-plus magazines and actually have deadlier higher-
velocity rifle cartridges but simply lack pistol grips and bayonet lugs-aesthetic features targeted by
June 2009]
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semiautomatics are quite commoni 6 The technology is at least a century
old in both handguns and long guns (including rifles and shotguns).' For
examgle, the Browning Auto-5 semiautomatic shotgun was introduced in
1902. The Colt 1911 .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol was adopted as the
U.S. military sidearm in 19i i.6 The Remington Model 8 semiautomatic
rifle was patented in I900.'" Even today, with its magazine protruding
below the breech, the Model 8 is roughly an assault weapon type.' These
guns and millions of other semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns,
have circulated in the civilian inventory for generations.72
Estimating the total number of semiautomatics in the private
inventory is difficult. Many were sold before even nominal record-
keeping was required under federal law.73 Many others were sold by the
U.S. government under the now-century-old Civilian Marksmanship
weapons bans).
66. See infra text accompanying note 78 (noting that 60% of gun owners have some sort of
semiautomatic gun).
67. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. Many early semiautomatic firearms are now
classified by the (ATF) as curios and relics. Special rules allow these guns to be sold and shipped
directly between licensed collectors. See I8 U.S.C. §§ 921-931 (20o6); 27 C.F.R. § 478.118 (2oo8)
(regulations issued under i8 U.S.C. §§ 921-931).
68. Browning.com, Auto-5 Semi-Automatic Shotgun, http://www.browning.com/customerservice/
dategun/detail.asp?id=13 (last visited June io, 2009).
69. THE GUN DIGEST: 1944 FIRST ANNUAL EDmON 6o (Charles Richmond Jacobs et al. eds., 1944)
[hereinafter GUN DIGEST FIRST ED.] ("The development of the automatic pistol between 1895 and
191i, and its adoption as the standard sidearm of most governments, have determined the general type
of most of the pistol cartridges in present use.").
70. Guns & Ammo, G&A Guide, Remington Model 8, http://www.gunsandammomag.com/cs/
Satellite/IMOGA/Guide_C/Remington+Model+8 (last visited June 10, 2009). Remington bought the
patent from designer John Browning, and marketed the gun beginning in 19o6. Remington.com,
Firearm Model History, Remington Model 8, http://www.remington.com/library/history/firearm-models/
centerfire/model_8.asp (last visited June so, 2009). Semiautomatic rifles date to at least an 1885 design
by Ferdinand Ritter von Mannlicher. See Austro-Hungarian Army, Ferdinand Ritter von Mannlicher,
http://www.austro-hungarian-army.co.uk/biog/mannlicher.htm (last visited June 1o, 2009) ("His first
semi-automatic rifle design appeared in 1885 .... ").
71. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. Winchester produced the earliest automatic .22 put
out in this country, the Model of I9o3. Charles T. Haven, Our Small Arms and Their Makers, in GUN
DIGEST FIRST Eo., supra note 69, at 7. Heavier automatics (read: semiautomatics) for hunting purposes
were brought out in 195o and I9O7 and since, in typical deer hunting cartridges. Id. Automatic and
repeating shotguns were also brought out before the First World War. Id. The Winchester s9o7, like
the typical assault weapon, accommodates a detachable box magazine. See Phil Davis, Winchester 19o7
Self Loader: zoo Year Old "Evil Assault Rifle," Gur'NEws, June 2o7, httpJ/sangamoncorifleassociation.org/
phildavis/winchesteri9o7selfloader.html. It fires a 351 Winchester cartridge that at s8o grains is more
than three times heavier than the typical 55 grain .223 round of the AR-s5 from available fifteen-
round magazines. Id.
72. NRA INST. FOR LEGISLATIvE ACTION, SEMI-AUTOMATIc FIREARMS AND THE "ASSAULT WEAPON"
ISSUE (2oo5), http://www.nraila.orglIssues/factsheetslread.aspx?ID=238. The National Rifle Association's
Institute for Legislative Action calculates the number of semiautomatics as fifteen percent of the total
privately-owned firearms inventory. Id.
73. See generally David Hardy, The Firearms Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal
Perspective, 17 CIMB. L. REV. 585, 589-95 (1986) (describing federal regulatory and record-keeping
requirements before the 1968 Gun Control Act).
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Program.74 Still, it is evident that semiautomatics are widely owned.75 In
the early debate over the 1994 ban, researchers from the Harvard School
of Public Health surveyed whether people who owned semiautomatic
firearms exhibited personal characteristics different from other gun
owners. 76 This study reflected the subtext of the 1994 ban that something
about the appearance of assault weapons attracted worrisome people,
and the researchers pressed this point with the argument that owners of
semiautomatic guns reported binge drinking more often than other gun
owners.77 For our purposes, the most significant finding was that sixty
percent of gun owners reported owning some type of semiautomatic
firearm.,8 This does not mean they all owned the archetypal AR-15.79
However, it does suggest that a clear majority of gun owners have at least
one gun that will fire as fast as they can pull the trigger. So it is just not
credible to say that semiautomatic technology is unusual or uncommon.
There is still the question whether the appearance of particular guns
somehow makes a difference. I have argued elsewhere that the focus on
things like pistol grips, ignoring functionality, borders on the absurd. 
8
Even ardent gun-control advocates have called the distinctions
"laughable." 8' Groups like the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence
make perfunctory attempts to sustain these distinctions," and the
74. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Testing the States' Rights Second Amendment for Content: A
Showdown Between Federal Environmental Closure of Firing Ranges and Protective State Legislation,
38 IND. L. REV. 689, 715-16 (2005) (describing the Civilian Marksmanship Program "for selling surplus
U.S. military arms and ammunition to civilians").
75. See David Hemenway & Elizabeth Richardson, Characteristics of Automatic or Semiautomatic
Firearm Ownership in the United States, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 286, 287 (1997); NRA INST. FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION, supra note 72.
76. See, e.g., Hemenway & Richardson, supra note 75, at 286.
77. Id. at 287.
78. Id.
79. See infra note 143 and accompanying text; see also Michael Bane, The World's Most Versatile
Rifle, OUrDooR LIFE, Aug. 2007, at 58-59 ("[Tihe AR has matured into one of the most versatile,
accurate and easy-to-shoot platforms in the world.").
8o. Johnson, supra note 65.
81. See, e.g., Sullum, supra note 41.
82. See BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, THE Top Io NRA MYTHS ABoUr ASSAULT
WEAPONS, http://www.bradycampaign.org/issues/assaultweapons/nramyths/ (last visited June io, 2009).
The Brady Center's commentary on assault weapons makes the argument that
the military features of semiautomatic assault weapons are designed to enhance their
capacity to shoot multiple targets very rapidly. For example, assault weapons are typically
equipped with large-capacity ammunition magazines that allow the shooter to fire 20, 50, or
even more than ioo rounds without having to reload. Pistol grips on assault rifles and
shotguns help stabilize the weapon during rapid fire and allow the shooter to spray-fire
from the hip position. Barrel shrouds on assault pistols protect the shooter's hands from the
heat generated by firing many rounds in rapid succession.... Far from being simply
"cosmetic," these features all contribute to the unique function of any assault weapon to
deliver extraordinary firepower. They are uniquely military features, with no sporting
purpose whatsoever.
... [These weapons] "are not generally recognied as particularly suitable for or readily
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discussion below will address those efforts. 8' But for now, realize that
semiautomatics with military features (e.g., pistol grips and bayonet lugs)
have dominated firearms sales in recent years, with the AR-15 (the
archetypal assault weapon) now the best-selling rifle type in the United
States."4 With Democrats in control of Congress and the White House, it
is widely reported that overall sales of semiautomatic rifles have
escalated to record levels.5
2. Are Assault Weapons Functionally Common?
Deciding whether a gun is functionally common requires some
context. All guns have SMUs that make them better or worse options as
self-defense scenarios shift.86 The two basic categories of civilian
firearms, long guns and handguns, exhibit respective SMUs of superior
adaptable to sporting purposes" and instead "are attractive to certain criminals."
The firepower of assault weapons makes them especially desired by violent criminals
and especially lethal in their hands.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting DEP'T OF TREASURY, STUDY ON THE SPORTING SurrAaiLrrY OF MODIFIED
SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT RIFLES 38 (1998)).
83. See infra Part II.A.2.
84. See Chuck Karwan, America's Rifle: The AR-i5 Has Weathered a 5o Year History of
Controversy, Survived a Federal Ban and Fought in Everything from Steaming Jungles to Sandboxes.
Now It's the Single Most Popular Centerfire Rifle in the U.S. Who Would've Guessed, COMBAT TACTICS,
GUNS & AMMO, Feb. 2009, at 24; Jeff Knox, The Year of the AR and FUD, SHOTGUN NEWS, Mar. 17,
2oo8, at 9 ("The AR-I5 is the fastest selling firearm in the country and it appears that everyone in the
industry is anxious to get in on the rush."). Citations to Shotgun News and similar publications may
raise eyebrows. However, for industry news these are standard publications. Serious studies, like the
congressionally-mandated evaluation of the impact of the 1994 ban, cite Shotgun News extensively on
the point of sales and pricing. See JEFFREY A. ROTH ET AL., THE URBAN INST., IMPACT EVALUATION OF
THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND RECREATIONAL FIREARMS USE PROTECTION ACT OF 1994 passim (1997).
85. See, e.g., Judson Berger, Obama Driving Surge in Gun Sales, Firearms Groups Say,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 16, 20o9, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2oo9/oi/i6/firearms-associations-claim-
obama-drove-surge-gun-sales/ ("End-of-the-year statistics show background checks for firearms
purchases rose sharply in the last three months of 20o8."); Nolan Findley, Obama is Stimulating Gun
Sales, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 8, 2009; Jacqui Seibel, Obama Election Triggers Run on Gun Sales in State,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 14, 2008, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/
34501994.html.
86. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 446-48.
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ballistics87  and concealability. 8  The handgun's concealability also
produces the greatest externalities. 9 Most gun crime is handgun crime.'
Cutting the categories more finely, both long guns and handguns
come in a range of ballistic variations (firing low, intermediate, or high-
powered ammunition)9' and a variety of repeating technologies. Fully
automatic repeaters (true machine guns) are rare in civilian hands. 92
Semiautomatics, including assault weapons, use part of the energy from
the fired cartridge to reset the firing mechanism.93 Other sorts of
repeating technologies use a combination of muscle and mechanical
power.' Some of these technologies are exactly as fast as semiautomatic
technology. For example, double-action revolver technology (in both
handguns and some long guns) fires with each pull of the trigger like a
semiautomatic.95 Manual repeaters-for example, cowboy-style lever
actions, pump actions, and bolt actions-will be slower than
semiautomatics by fractions of seconds to multiple seconds, depending in
part on the proficiency of the user.96 Multi-barrel technology may be
87. For a detailed discussion of comparative ballistics, see infra notes 142-71 and accompanying
text. Long guns, with their longer barrels, stronger chambers (accommodating larger cartridges and
thus larger powder charges), and design facilitating large-muscle-group support of the gun, are
generally more effective at distances where the handgun is nearly irrelevant. Carbine vs. Shotgun vs.
Pistol for Home Defense, Monster Hunter Nation, http://larrycorreia.wordpress.coM/2oo7/o9/2o/
carbine-vs-shotgun-vs-pistol-for-home-defense/ (last visited June 1o, 2009). The late Lieutenant
Colonel Jeff Cooper, founder of Gunsite Training Center and vociferous advocate for major calibers
in defensive handguns, famously said that for self-defense he would rather have a hatchet than a 9mm
at intimate range. R.K. Campbell, The Army Pistol (Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.gunblast.com/
RKCampbell-ArmyPistol.htm.
88. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 404.
89. See id. at 386.
90. See supra note 49.
9!. Armchairgunshow.com, Winchester Lever Action Rifles, http://www.armchairgunshow.com/
WinLever-info.html (last visited June so, 2009); FirearmsPrimer.com, Rifle Cartridge Selection,
httpJ/www.firearmsprimer.com/rifles/rifles_2.htm (last visited June so, 2009). There is no distinct number
for either velocity or energy, but generally rifle cartridges that fire a 15o grain projectile close to 3000
feet per second would be considered high power. Also "High Power" is the title of a very popular type
of rifle competition. But to provide examples, a .30-06 Springfield or a .300 Winchester Magnum
would be considered high power. The 7.62 x 39 (the cartridge most often used in the SS and AK-47
variants) and the 5.56 x 45 (very similar, but not identical, to the .223 Remington and used in most
AR-15 type rifles) would be considered intermediate cartridges. Publicola, Coming to Terms with Gun
Control, http://publicola.mu.nu/archives/2004/ 1/z8/coming_to_terms-withgun_control.html (last visited
June 1O, 2009).
92. See supra note 59.
93. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164 ("[T]he energy created by the explosion of gunpowder.., is
used to reload the next cartridge into the firing chamber.").
94. See GUN DIGEST 20O9: THE WORLD'S GREATEST GUN BOOK (Ken Ramage ed., 63rd ed. 2008)
(illustrating guns of all types including lever actions, bolt actions, pump actions, revolver actions and
semiautomatics firearms).
95. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164.
96. Steve Lee, Magnum Marlin: My .44 Caliber Friend, http://www.leverguns.com/articles/
lee.marlin44.htm (last visited June to, 2009). For aimed-fire at distance, the bolt action is generally
superior in accuracy and ballistics. Chuck Hawks, The Bolt Action, http://www.chuckhawks.com/
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faster than semiautomatic but typically with fewer shots available before
reloading.' Finally, repeating multi-projectile technology (i.e.,
semiautomatic, pump, or lever-action shotguns) actually fires more
projectiles faster than any of the rifles designated as assault weapons.9
Granting the assault weapons designation a rational construction,
the objection must be to multishot capability.' The DBM ammunition
feeding device is central to the designation." For policymakers who
seem to have devised ban lists by searching picture books for guns that
looked scary,'I ' it is understandable that the DBM, a visually distinct
multishot feature, would stand out. But is it unusual enough to fail
Heller's common-use test?
Semiautomatic guns employing the DBM are a century old. 2 Many
DBM guns avoid the assault weapons designation because they do not
have pistol grips, adjustable stocks, or bayonet lugs.' °3 I criticized early on
that such distinctions are functionally incoherent. 4 For example, under
the 1994 ban, the very same DBM gun was both legal and illegal
depending on whether someone dropped it into a different stock.' 5
There is no empirical evidence, and it is hard even to imagine plausible
arguments, that features like pistol grips, bayonet lugs, and folding stocks
produce different-let alone special or extraordinary6- externalities.
boltaction.htm (last visited June to, 20o9). In the military context, the scoped bolt action rifle of the
sniper is, by on one measure, far more deadly than repeating rifles like the M-16: "According to
figures released by the Department of Defense, the average number of rounds expended in Vietnam
to kill one enemy solder [sic] with the M-I6 was 50,o0o. The average number of rounds expended by
U.S. military snipers to kill one enemy soldier was 1.3 rounds." Rod Powers, Army Sniper School: One
Shot One Kill, http://usmilitary.about.com/od/armytmg/a/sniperschool.htm (last visited June io, 2o09).
97. Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-65.
98. Id. at 164-67. Some forms of rifle and pistol ammunition have attempted to copy this multi-
projectile functionality. Id. Duplex loads in rifles and pistols (two projectiles in the same case) double
the round count of each trigger pull. Id. The shotgun, in contrast, multiplies it many times depending
on the size of shot used in the cartridge. Id. Semiautomatic shotguns also have been classified as
assault weapons where they are fitted with pistol grips and folding stocks. Id.
99. See ROTH, supra note 84, at i ("Among other characteristics, ban proponents cited the
capacity of these weapons, most of which had been originally designed for military use, to fire many
bullets rapidly."). Supported by a grant from the National Institute of Justice, this study was mandated
by the 1994 ban to assess its impacts. Id. at 8.
ioo. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 165 ("Most semi-automatic firearms (both banned and
nonbanned) store their ammunition in detachable boxes called 'magazines."').
ioi. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 38, at 403 (describing how state assault weapons categories
seemed to be constructed by legislators flipping through catalogues to identify menacing-looking
guns).
102. See supra note 71 (describing early Winchester semiautomatics).
103. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 171-73.
104. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 441-43.
105. HALBROOK, supra note 37, at 701 ("Ruger is subjected to its own quandary-the exempted
Mini-14 is listed as 'w/o folding stock,' yet that rifle with a folding stock does not have a second feature
which makes it otherwise prohibited under the generic definitions below.").
io6. The 1997 assault weapons study mandated by the 1994 Act concludes, "[Wle were unable to
detect any reduction to date in two types of gun murders that are thought to be closely associated with
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The better explanation for these distinctions is symbolism. The
objection was that assault weapon features were combat features; assault
weapons were illegitimate because they were openly geared for gun
fighting."° Before Heller, such distinctions could be explained by the
formulation that the only legitimate guns were "sporting" guns. As a
matter of policy, self-defense was submerged and even stigmatized. 11
Guns purely for defense against human aggressors, signaled in the minds
of some by bayonet lugs and adjustable stocks, could be marginalized
and outlawed.'" With Heller's explicit protection of handguns and other
common self-defense guns,"' the "sporting use" filter and corresponding
distinctions based on appearance cannot be sustained."' So not only are
these distinctions in appearance functionally irrelevant, post-Heller they
are impermissible.
This still leaves the question whether semiautomatics, and
particularly semiautomatics that use DBMs, are functionally distinct. The
contention is these guns have exceptional multishot capabilities."' This is
just wrong. Multishot utility does not distinguish the assault weapon. The
assault weapon is surpassed in this category by a class of indisputably
common guns that fire multiple projectiles per trigger pull and can be
continuously reloaded without disabling the weapon. The category is the
ubiquitous shotgun, in either semiautomatic or manual repeating mode."3
The assault weapon has been identified as a "spray-fire" weapon
designed for shooting multiple projectiles without aiming."4 This is
assault weapons .... " ROTH, supra note 84, at 2. The focus on accoutrements might be understood as
rooted in the "sporting use" importation standard under the Gun Control Act of 1968, which is an
interesting story of public and private motivations. See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment
Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun Control, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 715, 771-73 (2005) (describing
the trade protectionism of the New England gun manufacturers as an impulse for the sporting-use
filter in the 1968 Gun Control Act).
107. See, e.g., BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 82 (claiming that guns with
assault weapon features have only military application).
io8. The Brady organization urged that the only legitimate use of firearms was "sporting
purposes." See Press Release, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Tiger Woods' "Gun-Toting
Spectator" Confirms Weapons Problems at Sports Venues (Feb. 2, 1999), available at http://
www.bradycampaign.org/media/release.php?release= 158.
109. Supra note tot.
IIo. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2717-22 (2oo8).
i I i. Kopel argues that even pre-Heller, the assault weapons distinction could not pass a seriously
administered rational-basis test. Kopel, supra note 38, at 417.
112. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12275.5 (West 2oo8) ("The Legislature has restricted the assault
weapons.., based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and capacity for
firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by
the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings.").
113. Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-67.
I14. See, e.g., BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, ASSAULT WEAPONS THREATEN OUR
SAFETY AND SECURITY, http://www.bradycampaign.orglissues/assaultweapons/awoverview/ (last visited
June s0, 2009) ("Pistol grips on assault rifles and shotguns help stabilize the weapon during rapid fire
and allow the shooter to spray-fire from the hip position."); LEGAL COMMUNITY AGAINST VIOLENCE,
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false."5 The shotgun better fits that description. It is designed to hit
moving or multiple targets with a cloud of projectiles, a stream of
spherical "shot."" 6 Depending on the loading, the number of projectiles
will range from six large projectiles to hundreds of tiny spheres smaller
than a BB." 7 Shotguns do not require traditional "aiming" and do not
even have traditional sights (i.e., a rear sight through which one aligns
with the front sight to ensure a straight line between shooter's eye and
the target).",8  Most shotguns have a simple bead at the front."9
Shotgunners will comment that they never noticed that the bead was
missing, because shotguns fire to, and impact, a visual swath rather than
a precise point of aim.' In contrast, a rifle without its sights is relatively
nonfunctional. All common rifles of every configuration shoot a single
projectile per cycle in a straight path.' No matter how quickly they
cycle, hitting targets reliably requires aiming.'22
Another distinction between assault weapons and the shotgun is that
the shotgun ammunition supply can be "topped off." Most repeating
shotguns store ammunition in a tube magazine directly below the
barrel.'23 The next round is moved from the tube into the chamber either
BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS-A LEGAL PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION I (reprint 2005), available
at http.//www.cav.org/library/reports-analyses/Banning-Assault-WeaponsA-Legal-Primer-8.05_entire.pdf
("Key assault weapon features include .. pistol grips ... facilitating spray firing from the hip.");
VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., BULLET HOSES: SEMIAUTOMATIC ASSAULT WEAPONS-WHAT ARE THEY? WHAT'S
So BAD ABOUT THEM? (2003), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/hosecont.htm (follow "Ten Key
Points about What Assault Weapons Are and Why They Are So Deadly" hyperlink) ("'Spray-firing'
from the hip, a widely recognized technique for the use of assault weapons in certain combat
situations, has no place in civil society."). To justify the claim, the publication includes photographs of
military personnel firing machine guns in this manner. Id. (follow "The Gun Industry's Lies"
hyperlink).
115. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 388 ("[Allthough gun prohibition advocates sometimes use the
catch-phrase 'spray-fire,' a semiautomatic firearm, unlike a machine gun, cannot 'spray fire,' because
the shooter must press the trigger for each shot.").
116. W. W. GREENER, THE GUN AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 351-73 (Cassell & Co., Ltd. 9th ed. I9IO)
(1881).
117. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-67.
II8. GREENER, supra note II6, at 434-68.
1i9. Id.
120. Id. at 351-52.
121. See PHILIP B. SHARPE, THE RIFLE IN AMERICA (Odysseus 1995) (1938).
122. See id.
123. See, e.g., O.F. MOSSBERG & SONS, INC., OWNERS MANUAL FOR 50o®, 835® AND 590® MODEL
PUMP ACTION SHOTGUNS 6, available at http://zugzwanged.org/dat/weapons/docs/man/
mossberg_5oo.pdf. Many shotguns are semiautomatic, though typically these have been excluded from
assault weapon designation. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-65. A greater number are pump action,
which typically have also been excluded from assault weapon designation. Id. Guns of each type have
been made with detachable magazines. See Saiga-12.com, IZHMASH Saiga-12 Shotguns,
http://www.saiga-i2.com/ (last visited June 1o, 2009). A few shotguns have been made using revolver
technology. See HALBROOK, supra note 37, at 538-39. In a curious exercise of logic, though
understandable symbolically, the ATF reclassified one of these revolver style guns-the menacingly-
named Streetsweeper-as a class III destructive device (the same regulatory category as machine
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by recoil energy (for semiautomatics), or manually for pump or slide
actions.' While the gun is deployed, the ammunition tube may be
continuously refreshed with new rounds.'25 There is no downtime to
reload. '26 So not only are assault weapons unexceptional in multishot
utility, they are demonstrably inferior to the ubiquitous shotgun.'27
Comparisons between assault weapons and other repeating
technologies produce similar conclusions. DBM semiautomatics like the
AR-15 are reloaded from the bottom of the breech by replacing the
spent magazine with a new one."' In contrast, the top-loading block clip
employed by the semiautomatic Mi Garand (and also by one of the very
first semiautomatic rifles, the Mannlicher Model i886) will achieve
roughly the same practical rate of fire in addition to firing a more
powerful cartridge than the typical assault weapon.'29 After all the rounds
are fired, the block clip ejects automatically from the top of the breech,
and the shooter inserts a new clip into the open breech. 3 The Garand
was the standard World War II battle rifle and surplus Garands have
been sold directly to private citizens by the U.S. government for decades
through the Civilian Marksmanship Program.'3'
Lever action rifles, familiar emblems of the Old West with typical
ammunition capacity from ten to sixteen rounds, predate semiautomatic
technology but are only slightly slower in multishot capability."' They
also are continuously reloadable.'33 Revolver technology of the same
guns). Id. The irony is that the gun does not exhibit the continuous reloading capacity that is the
tactical virtue of the ordinary repeating shotgun. Id.
124. See MOSSBERG, supra note 123.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Shotguns do exhibit the ballistic disadvantage that the projectiles are round and fired from an
unrifled barrel, are thus less aerodynamic than the spinning rifle projectile, and therefore lose velocity
more quickly. See GREENER, supra note 116, at 351-404. So, depending upon size, shotgun projectiles
will have lost most of their energy within ioo to 200 yards. Id. However, within its range, the shotgun
firing various loads inflicts far more destruction on soft targets than the typical assault weapon. Id.
128. See, e.g., BUSHMASTER FIREARMS, INC., OPERATING AND SAFETY INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR ALL
BUSHMASTER XM15 MODELS 39 (2oo9), available at http:/www.ar15.com/contentlmanuals/
manualbushmaster.pdf.
129. See U.S. ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL: FM 23-5 (1965), available at http://
biggerhammer.net/manuals/garand/mi.htm; see also Austro-Hungarian Army, supra note 70 (describing
the Mannlicher's block clip feeding device).
130. See U.S. ARMY, supra note 129.
131. The Civilian Marksmanship Program website gives a detailed history of the military use of the
M1 Garand and the current requirements for purchasing one through the Civilian Marskmanship
Program. See Civilian Marksmanship Program Sales, Eligibility Requirements, http://www.thecmp.org/
eligibility.htm (last visited June 1o, 2009); Civilian Marksmanship Program Sales, Mi Garand Sales,
http://www.thecmp.org/migarand.htm (last visited June io, 2009).
132. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 96. For aimed fire there are nominal distinctions in speed. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., U.S. REPEATING ARMS Co., INC., WINCHESTER RIFLES AND SHOTGUNS, WINCHESTER
MODEL 94 LEVER ACTION RIFLE OWNER'S MANUAL-ToP-TANG SAFETY VERSION 17-18, available at
June 2009]
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vintage is essentially indistinguishable from semiautomatic in terms of
practical rate of fire (one shot for every trigger pull).I"
So in context, it is difficult to say that assault weapons impose
multishot capabilities that are functionally distinct from many other guns
in the inventory of common firearms. Moreover, the entire focus on
multishot capacity is undercut by the fact that all guns are deadly, all
guns have distinct SMUs, and those utilities produce their own distinct
externalities. The handgun, which is explicitly protected by Heller,
accounts for most gun crime.3' Assault weapons, in contrast, are very
rarely used in crime. 36 So on this measure as well, the assault weapon is
easily within the boundaries of protected firearms.
B. THE REGULATORY PARADOX: SPECIAL MARGINAL UTILITIES AND
PECULIAR EXTERNALITIES
Within the inventory of common firearms, each gun type has distinct
utilities at the margin that make it more or less suitable as self-defense
scenarios shift. These differences in SMUs are crucial to the assault
weapons distinction, but they also present a paradox. To satisfy even a
threshold rational-basis analysis, the state must show that banned assault
weapons have some identifiable SMUs that produces special externalities
when abused.'37 Thus the paradox: if the distinction is sound-if the ban
is rational-it also is an admission of special utility. And that paradox
poses a pivotal constitutional question. As Justice Breyer and others
have criticized, Heller does not tell us how to cut such knots.' But
Stenberg does.
The controlling question in Stenberg was whether the banned D&X
abortion procedure was sometimes the better methodology for
preservation of the life or health of the mother.'39 Because D&X was
found to be necessary in rare cases to preserve the life or health of the
mother, the ban was deemed unconstitutional.40 This section will
examine the parallel assault weapons question: do the SMUs exhibited
by assault weapons make them better alternatives than other common
guns in a particular spectrum of self-defense scenarios, where by
http://media.winchesterguns.com/pdf/om/o2227_wfa-94-om-s.pdf.
134. See, e.g., STURM, RUGER & CO., INC., INSTRUCTION MANUAL FOR RUGER® GPiOo® DOUBLE
ACTION REVOLVER 14.
135. Supra notes 89-9o and accompanying text.
136. RoTH, supra note 84, at 2.
137. See Kopel, supra note 38, at 384-85.
138. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2864 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (while
seeming to believe it cuts the other way, Justice Breyer acknowledges the paradox: "[Tihe very
attributes that make handguns particularly useful for self-defense are also what make them
particularly dangerous.").
139. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,929-30 (2ooo).
140. Id. at 938.
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definition the life of the right-bearer is at stake? Subsection i will
describe purely objective SMUs-physical measures that can be precisely
calculated. Subsection 2 will summarize "tactical" SMUs-more
subjective assessments that rely on human judgments about the relative
effectiveness of different technologies.
i. Objectively Measurable Utility
The typical assault weapon fires an intermediate power cartridge
that is less destructive than cartridges employed in sporting rifles (many
of them semiautomatics) used for hunting medium to large game.'4 ' So on
this criteria the typical assault weapon actually complements the state's
interest in reducing firearms externalities. An explicit comparison is
helpful.
Consider first the AR-5 . '42 It is the quintessential assault weapon. It
exhibits all of the objectionable features identified in the 1994 ban.43 It
typically fires a lightweight 55 to 62 grain, .223 caliber/5.56MM
projectile.'" In contrast, most hunting rifles that were broadly exempted
from the 1994 ban are ballistically far superior to the AR-I5.'4 s Many of
them are DBM, semiautomatic repeaters chambered for cartridges like
the .3o-o6 Springfield, 46 which fires bullets three to four times heavier
than the .223.' 47 Two prominent examples are the Remington 740o' 4' and
the Browning BAR, both explicitly excluded from the 1994 ban. 49 Also
excluded was the Mi Garand,'5 ° the U.S. Army battle rifle used in World
War II and featured prominently in the film Saving Private Ryan.'5' In
141. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 168-69.
142. Halbrook explains that the AR-15 designation is a misnomer, and that a more accurate label
might be AR-15A2 Sporter II. HALBROOK, supra note 37, at 700-o1. However, the term "AR-15" is so
commonly used that I will employ that designation.
143. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 190-93.
i44. Id. at I68.
145. Id. at 168-69.
146. The cartridge is designated .30-06 because it is a .30 caliber adopted by the U.S. military in
19o6 for the Springfield bolt-action infantry rifle. Craig Boddington, .3o-06." Over 95 Years Old, It
Remains America's Favorite Hunting Cartridge, PETERSEN'S HUTnNG, http://www.huntingmag.com/
gunsloads/3o_o6_springfield/ (last visited June io, 2009). "[Tlhe powerful .30-06 rifle cartridge
developed by the United States Government during the year 19o6 .... is one of the best military rifle
cartridges in use in the world today.... [A]ccurate shooting can be done with it in a rifle at over i,ooo
yards." Charles T. Haven, Military Small Arms of World War H, in GUN DIGEST FIRST ED., supra note
69, at 55. It is perennially one of the most popular hunting cartridges in the United States. Charles
Petty, What's Really Selling?, SHooTING INDUSTRY, Feb. 2o06, at 21.
147. See infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
148. Simpson, supra note 64 at 62,63 ("[The 195o series] was initially offered only in .30-o6.
149. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 209.
150. Id. at 204-09.
151. The Internet Movie Firearms Database, Saving Private Ryan, http://www.irnfdb.org/
index.php/SavingPrivateRyan (last visited June 10, 2009). It is ironic that the Garand was exempted
under the ban, see Dave Kopel, Bait-'n'-Switch: Gun-prohibition lobbyists are after much more than AK-
47s, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/kopel/kopeL2oo4o9I3o63o.asp,
since it is not merely a military-style weapon, but rather the real thing. See The Patton Soc'y, The Mi
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appearance the Garand seems closer to the Remington or the Browning.
It features a traditional wood stock and has none of the typical assault
weapon features except for an unobtrusive bayonet lug.'52
The .30-06 cartridge, fired by the Remington, the Browning, and the
Garand as fast as one can pull the trigger, propels a 15o-grain bullet
(nearly three times heavier than the 55-grain projectile typical for the
AR-15) at 3100 feet per second producing muzzle energy of 3200 foot-
pounds.'53 At 400 yards it is still traveling at 2058 feet per second,
carrying 1410 foot-pounds of energy.'54 In contrast, the far smaller and
lighter .223 fired by the aggressively-styled AR-15 produces 1282 foot-
pounds of energy at the muzzle and 296 foot-pounds at 400 yards.'
These measures for the .223 are from a test barrel that is typically six to
eight inches longer than the sixteen-inch barrel of the most aggressively
styled "M4 clone" version of the AR-I5 (distinguished by the shorter
barrel and adjustable stock).1"6 As barrel length decreases, so does
destructive energy because the pressure in the short barrel is dissipated
in the atmosphere instead of building behind the bullet for a longer time
and space. 1
57
The physics are plain. The 1994 ban outlawed guns that are
demonstrably less lethal than millions of government-approved
"sporting" guns and countless actual military rifles that just do not look
very dangerous. The ballistic superiority of many sporting guns is not a
function of more recent or more advanced technology; some of the
earliest semiautomatic "sporting" rifles manufactured in America
produce more destructive energy than the AR-i5.' Moreover, many
exempt semiautomatic "sporting" rifles are available in cartridges that
are ballistically superior even to the .30-06. For example, the previously-
discussed Remington and Browning semiautomatics are available in
Garand Rifle, http://www.pattonhq.com/garand.html (last visited June 1o, 2009). It is an actual
government-issued infantry rifle-a military weapon that General George S. Patton, Jr. called the
"greatest battle implement ever devised." Id.
152. The United States Civilian Marksmanship Program web site offers multiple illustrations and a
detailed description of the Garand. See supra note 131; see also The Patton Soc'y, supra note 151.
153. Average Centerfire Rifle Cartridge Ballistics and Prices [hereinafter Ballistics and Prices], in
GUN DIGEST 2007: THE WORLD'S GREATEST GUN BOOK 229, 232 (Ken Ramage ed., 61st ed. 200 6); see
also Haven, supra note 69, at 55 ("[T]he powerful .3o-o6 rifle cartridge developed by the United States
Government during the year i9o6 .... is one of the best military rifle cartridges in use in the world
today.... [A]ccurate shooting can be done with it in a rifle at over i,ooo yards.").
154. Ballistics and Prices, supra note 153.
155. Id. at 229.
156. Id.
157. See GREENER, supra note 116, at 566.
158. The Remington Model 8 (first sold in i9o6) chambered in .35 Remington fires a 2oo-grain
bullet and produces 1921 foot-pounds of energy at the muzzle. Ballistics and Prices, supra note 153, at
233; Remington.com, supra note 70. Compare the 1282 foot-pounds of muzzle energy from the AR-I5
firing the .223. See Ballistics and Prices, supra note 153, at 229.
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magnum calibers like the .338 Winchester Magnum, which generates
nearly double the ballistic energy of .30-06 (again, firing as fast as one
can pull the trigger).'
True, at some point discussions about muzzle energy become moot.
The practical difference between the .30-06 and the .338 in terms of
lethality at usable distances may be negligible. But that is because both
calibers are in the same ballistic category."' However, the intermediate
cartridges fired by the typical assault weapon are in a lower power
class. 6' They are less lethal across their entire ballistic range. 6, Indeed, as
a hunting cartridge, the .223 (the AR-15 cartridge) is widely considered
suitable only for "varmints" (e.g., ground squirrels or prairie dogs). In
many places it is illegal for hunting deer or other medium-to-large game
because it tends just to wound rather than cleanly kill the animal. 36
The ballistic inferiority of the assault weapon is a matter of
conscious design.' 6' The typical assault weapon cartridge is explicitly
intended to wound rather than kill.' 65 So ballistically, not only is the AR-
15 not exceptionally dangerous, its lower lethality actually complements
the state interest in controlling negative externalities. And from the
perspective of the gun user, these ballistic characteristics translate into
another important utility.
For many older, weaker, or smaller people, the relatively low-
powered assault weapon offers an easier learning curve, less punishing
practice, and an ease of use that is unmatched by other choices. The
semiautomatic configuration, whose repeating mechanism uses some of
the energy that otherwise would contribute to recoil, makes the gun
more manageable than other technologies firing the same cartridge.'6
159. See supra note 153.
16o. Ballistics and Prices, supra note 153, at 231-33.
16I. Id. at 229.
162. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 168-7o.
163. See, e.g., CONN. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., CONNECTICUT HUNTING AND TRAPPING GUIDE 4, 9-13
(2009), available at http://www.ct.gov/deplib/dep/hunting-trappinglpdf-files/fg2oo9.pdf (requiring .243
minimum caliber for deer hunting: "Legal Firearms: 12, 16, or 20 gauge breech loading shotgun loaded
with single soft alloy projectile ammunition. Rifled or smoothbore barrels allowed. Shotgun must not
be capable of holding more than 3 shells. Centerfire rifle 6mm (.243 caliber) or larger, or muzzleloader
(.45 caliber minimum).").
64. Kopel, supra note 40, at 169 ("The great irony... is that [assault weapons] are the only rifles
that have ever been designed not to kill. The semi-automatic rifles use the same ammunition as
battlefield weapons such as the M16, which deliberately use intermediate-power ammunition intended
to wound rather than to kill. The theory is that wounding an enemy soldier uses up more of his side's
resources (to haul him off the battlefield and then care for him) than does killing an enemy.").
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., ShotgunLife.com, Women and Shotguns, Good Form and Shotgun Recoil, http://
www.shotgunlife.comlWomen-Shooters/women-and-shotguns.html (last visited June 1o, 2009) ("Semi-
automatic shotguns-or autoloaders as they're also known-are prized for their low felt recoil
compared with over/unders. A semi-automatic uses some of the expanding gases from the fired shell to
cycle the next one into the chamber. So rather than you absorbing the full force of the shot, a semi-
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Comparatively, the substantial recoil from the shotgun disqualifies it as a
defensive tool for man' people.'67 The same is true for medium-to-large
game sporting rifles.' The recoil from many of these is punishing,
bruising, and makes practice, and therefore proficiency, difficult.' 69 Even
the Mi Garand, though its recoil is reduced by its semiautomatic design,
produces comparatively much greater recoil because it fires the powerful
.30-06 cartridge.'7" The Garand is also relatively heavy and long, making
it generally difficult for smaller people to manipulate.'7'
Assault weapons also present ergonomic and operational advantages
over alternatives. The typical assault weapon is easily fixed with optics
that enhance aiming and accuracy.'72 The carbine length of the typical
automatic puts that energy to good use.").
167. See id. Expert gun fitters address part of the problem, but for people who cannot afford or do
not even know about such services, "an ill-fitting shotgun heightens felt recoil. If you're unable to
properly press the shotgun against your shoulder and face, the felt recoil could hurt like crazy." Id. at
2; see also Diane Campbell, Shotgun Training Tips for Female and Smaller Officers, POLICEONE.COM,
July 6, 2007, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/firearms/shotguns/articles/I287382-Shotgun-
training-tips-for-female-and-smaler-officers/ ("Let's face it. Many officers, particularly female and
smaller officers, may be just plain afraid of shotguns. Whether real or imagined, the shotgun has a
reputation for being painful. Often this reputation comes from poor training, too heavy a load or just
incorrect handling. This really is a shame, since the shotgun is such a versatile use-of-force tool for law
enforcement as well as home defense.").
168. Chuck Hawks, Remington Managed-Recoil Cartridges, http://www.chuckhawks.com/
remmanaged recoil.htm (last visited June to, 2009) [hereinafter Hawks, Remington] ("Although
many will not admit it, most hunters find cartridges on the order of the .270, 7mm Magnum, .308, and
.30-06 somewhat intimidating to shoot. And very few shooters are really comfortable shooting a .300
Magnum."); see also Chuck Hawks, The Powerful .300 Magnums, http://www.chuckhawks.com/
3oomagnum.htm (last visited June 1o, 2009) ("The .300 Magnums are generally regarded as suitable
for game from the size of deer and antelope to the largest thin-skinned game worldwide.... The main
drawback to any of the .300 Magnums is recoil, which is more than most shooters can handle.... Many
professional guides in North America are suspicious of customers who show up with .300 Mag. rifles
until they prove they can shoot their formidable rifles accurately.").
169. See supra note i68.
170. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., All Things Considered, Book Explores History of the American Rifle (NPR radio
broadcast Dec. 21, 2oo8) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org./templates/story/
story.php?storyld=98578531). The difference is illustrated anecdotally in this interview with
Alexander Rose, author of American Rifle: A Biography. The interviewer, a young woman, fires an
Mi Garand and then an AR-15 . She comments unenthusiastically that the Garand is "heavy." Id.
There is no on-air comment about the recoil but people who have fired the Garand can imagine that
interesting things did not make it on air. The Garand hurts to shoot. Her comment about the AR-s5
puts things in perspective. "It's a scary looking black thing," she says. Id. Then after firing it, "That
was easy. It does not kick back at you." Id. This last comment was obviously in contrast to the heavy-
recoiling Garand. This difference is the essence of controllability. As a self-defense gun, the Garand
(and many more powerful, heavier hunting guns) by many estimates would be too much gun for a
woman of average strength and build, and perhaps many others. See id. The AR-15 in contrast would
not.
172. See Hawks, Remington, supra note 168. While many sporting long guns also employ optics,
those guns typically are heavier, longer, more powerful, and thus more punishing to practice with. Id.
Shotguns similarly can be fitted with optics, but present similar disadvantages in terms of recoil,
weight, and length. Id.
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assault weapon exploits the long-gun's more stable sighting platform (the
shooter stabilizes the gun at four contact points-two hands, the
shoulder pocket, and the cheek weld).'73 The handgun, in contrast, is
more difficult to hold steady. Even with a two-handed hold it enjoys half
the contact points of the long gun, and then requires the user to employ
open sights, which means aligning three different planes of sight (rear
sight, front sight, and target).74 This is harder to do as people age.'75
Moreover, at any age, proficiency with the handgun requires more
practice and a higher level of skill and dexterity. In fact, some double
action revolvers have such heavy trigger pulls that many adults cannot
operate them."6
2. Tactical (Subjective) Special Marginal Utilities
Some assault weapon SMUs are more subjective in the sense that
users, both ordinary and expert, will exhibit different personal
preferences for them as self-defense scenarios shift."7 Among
professional trainers of both police and civilians, the assault weapon is
widely recommended as the most versatile and effective self-defense
tool.' Professional instructors list ruggedness, ergonomics, accuracy, low
recoil, versatility, and other tactical advantages that make the assault
weapon a premium self-defense technology.'79 This is especially true for
the AR-15, whose military and law enforcement pedigree means that
"the top tactical minds of our generation have figured out the best ways
to use AR-platform guns in all sorts of scenarios."'s° Because the assault
weapon typically fires a ballistically intermediate round, it recoils less
173. See HAL W. HENDRICK ET AL., HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES IN HANDGUN SAFETY AND FORENSICS
(2007).
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., Donald L. MacDaniel, Pistol Shooter's Rx for Tired Eyes, AM. RIFLEMAN, May 1984,
at 37; Robert B. Pomeranz, Aging Eyes and Iron Sights, AM. RIFLEMAN, Sept. 1995, at 34.
176. For example, a nineteen-year-old student of mine, who had aspirations to join the state police,
found it impossible to complete the double action trigger pull on a Smith and Wesson Model 28
"Highway Patrolman" revolver double action. He was 5'9" and weighed I4O pounds. He was an
athlete and a very good runner, but he did not have the hand strength to fire the gun without first
cocking it into single action mode.
177. Preference for the AR-15, for example, has been driven by popular firearms trainer Clint
Smith's development of the "Urban Rifle" doctrine. Tiger McKee, Simplify for Success: The Basic AR
Fighting Rifle, GUNS MAG., COMBAT SPECIAL EDITION 2009, at 44,46.
178. See, e.g., Bane, supra note 79, at 58-61 ("The numbers are staggering. AR-platform guns are
approaching handgun-level sales .... [E]rgonomics, coupled with ease of operation, light weight and
the negligible recoil from the 5.56 cartridge, make AR-platform guns a blast to shoot. As an
instructor,... [n]ow I use an AR] [for totally new shooters.] ... The more I've worked with the
carbine, the more I've found myself 'defaulting' to the AR for a self-defense role."). Bane says the
only reason he needs a handgun is to get to his rifle. Id. Over the past twenty years, I have taken scores
of novices to the shooting range. Without exception, they find the low-powered semi-automatic rifle
easier to shoot than the handgun.
179. Id.
Iso. Id. at 60.
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than high-power or magnum guns.'"' So owners of assault weapons will
tend to practice more and thus should be more capable in emergencies. '
A separate utility appears in the militia context. As elaborated in
Heller, the Second Amendment protects the armed citizenry from which
the militia may be drawn.' 83 In emergencies, citizens appearing with their
own guns become a public resource.' 4 People will dispute the usefulness
of the unorganized militia in modern America, but with its constitutional
pedigree established in Heller, it is an important question whether
certain types of guns serve that interest more than others.
The assault weapon is the quintessential militia rifle. The AR-i 5, for
example, is a semiautomatic rendition of the U.S. military infantry rifle,
with the important difference that it does not have automatic or burst-
fire capability.'85 But otherwise, the mechanics and controls are the same
and it uses the same magazines and ammunition.'6 In emergencies where
the militia becomes an important resource, civilians who are familiar
with or own such guns will be more useful than others as adjuncts to
public security forces.
While the militia utility anticipates a community response to public
emergencies, public emergencies also generate private risks. In other
work, I have described private guns held for these occasions as "stormy-
day" guns'-firearms held for episodes like those anticipated by the
National Governors Association when it complained that the heavy use
of the National Guard in war fighting leaves states vulnerable in an array
of public emergencies.' 88 The assault weapon is the model stormy-day
gun. Its multishot capability neutralizes the numerical advantage of
multiple aggressors or a mob. '89 The intermediate cartridge operates to
18I. See HALBROOK, supra note 37; Kopel, supra note 40, at 168-69.
182. See supra Part II.B.I for discussion of intermediate ballistics.
183. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2815 ("The traditional militia was formed from
a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use at the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense.").
184. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 40, at 194-95 (describing situations where armed citizens helped
restore public order after disasters).
185. Id. at 163; see also ARi5.com, Home of the Black Rifle, http://www.ari5.com/ (last visited
June 1o, 2009). Some variations of the M16 fire three rounds per trigger pull. For a discussion of this
"burst" capability, see Military Analysis Network, Fed'n of Am. Scientists, MI6A2 5.56mm
Semiautomatic Rifle, M4/M4AI, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-ioi/sys/land/mi6.htm (last visited June
10, 2006).
i86. See BUSHMASTER, supra note 128.
187. Johnson, supra note I, at 861-63. Others have used the term "Katrina Rifle" to connote the
same thing. See David Kenik, Katrina Rifle, in GUNS & AMMO: BooK OF THE AR-15, Feb. 2009, at 86.
r88. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Bush Policies Are Weakening National Guard, Governors Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2oo6/o2/27/politics/27govs.html ("Governors
of both parties said Sunday that Bush administration policies were stripping the National Guard of
equipment and personnel needed to respond to hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, forest fires and other
emergencies.").
189. Kopel, supra note 40, at 175.
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neutralize both a wounded attacker and his caretakers."9 This same
feature lessens the burden on innocents when the gun is abused. 9' The
appearance of the assault weapon is distinct enough even at a distance to
achieve deterrence by brandishing.'92 Other guns are decidedly inferior
stormy-day options. The handgun, by definition a last-ditch tool limited
essentially to contact distance, would be useful only at distances where it
may be too late to fight back.'93 Shotguns and hunting-caliber rifles are
inferior because they recoil harder and thus are harder-and for some,
impossible-to use." The rational actor, thinking about self-defense
under a range of circumstances, has sound reasons to count the assault
weapon as the best alternative in the inventory of common firearms.
III. ASSAULT WEAPON BANS AND THE STENBERG STANDARD
The discussion so far shows that assault weapons fit comfortably
within the category of common firearms nominally protected under
Heller'95 and that they exhibit SMUs that are especially important to
particular types of people and in particular categories of self-defense.
But what happens when the SMUs of common firearms are claimed to
produce peculiar externalities that the state wants to combat by banning
them? The question takes us beyond Heller. But it is the core of
Stenberg. Substituting firearms "technologies" for abortion
"methodologies," whether to protect the special life-saving utilities of
assault weapons against a government ban that forces reliance on lesser
alternatives, is the question of principle answered in Stenberg.
At first glance the assertion of broad parallels between abortion and
gun rights jurisprudence seems odd. However, on core principles there is
a broad intersection between the two claims. This is evident from the
many treatments that build the abortion right on the self-defense
principles that undergird Heller.
More than a decade ago, I showed that the ideas and principles used
by the Court and scholars to draw the unenumerated right to abortion
out of the Constitution run remarkably parallel to, and in core cases
build directly upon, arguments and principles supporting a constitutional
19o. Id. at 168.
191. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
192. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-
Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CirM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, tbl.3 at 185 (1995) (indicating that the vast
majority of civilian defensive gun uses are brandishing scenarios where the gun is not fired).
193. See FBI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS KILLED AND ASSAULTED 2004, at
6 (2005), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/killed/2oo4/downloads/LEOKAo4.pdf (indicating that
confrontations with handguns occur at very close distances where few shots are fired and the person
involved often misses).
194. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
195. See 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2717-22 (2008).
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right to arms for self-defense.' 6 That article, Principles and Passions,
argued that the "standard position of the left" perversely disparages
claims of a right to armed self-defense under the Second Amendment,
but exalts a derivative and relatively weaker unenumerated right to
abortion."g As the analysis here will show, the standard position endures
and is reflected in the abortion and gun jurisprudence of the Court's
liberal wing. This, attitudinalists will say, is exactly what we should
expect."9'
I will show here how the assault weapons question raises parallel
issues of special self-defense utility and how the Court's treatments of the
abortion and gun questions invoke the attitudinalist critique. Section A
summarizes the argument that there are controlling parallels between the
abortion and gun rights claims. Section B extends that argument to the
particular parallels between assault weapons and partial-birth abortion as
evaluated under Stenberg, and illustrates the burden of principle Stenberg
poses for the liberal wing of the Court. Section C incorporates the
Court's treatment of partial-birth abortion in Gonzales which, in its
constriction of Stenberg, poses for Court conservatives a similar but
lesser rendition of the attitudinalist challenge.
A. SELF-DEFENSE AND THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO ABORTION
As I highlighted in Principles and Passions, one of the obvious
illustrations of the abortion/gun rights parallel is Donald Regan's effort
to situate the abortion right within the spectrum of permissible self-
defense scenarios.' Regan begins with the model case of self-defense
against a willful criminal attacker.2' After many contortions, he plots at
the far end of the self-defense spectrum several weaker scenarios he says
are analogous to the self-defense claim of a woman who chooses
abortion in order to avoid the physical trauma of child birth."' Regan's
analysis is particularly important because it shows the relative strengths
of the abortion and self-defense claims. The strongest abortion claim is
where the mother risks death or serious injury by continuing the
pregnancy. In those narrow circumstances, abortion is just like the model
self-defense case."' But in the vast majority of abortions there is no
196. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 115; see also Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 J.L. EcoN. &
POL'Y 187, 199 (2oo6).
197. Johnson, supra note 12, at 99-1oo.
198. See Doff, supra note 22, at 498-99.
199. Johnson, supra note 12, at 102-09 (critiquing Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77
MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979)).
200. Regan, supra note I99, at 1611.
201. Id. at 1611-13.
202. Id. at 1613-6.
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threat to the life of the mother.2" So under Regan's analysis, most
abortion claims are qualitatively weaker than most self-defense claims.
Regan's arguments have generated a wide following, and were even
invoked by Justice (then Judge) Ginsburg in her own commentary
supporting the abortion right. 4 Regan's is one of many essays and
articles that I critiqued in Principles and Passions.' A second is Judith
Thomson's effort to justify abortion as a matter of moral philosophy. 6
Cass Sunstein has said that Thomson and Regan provide the strongest
justifications for a constitutional right to abortion."
Through a series of self-defense analogies, Thomson argues that,
even conceding that the fetus is a person at conception, with a life-
interest equal to the mother's, abortion still can be justified. 8 She posits
the case of a mother trapped in a very small house with a rapidly growing
child."° The child is growing at such a rate that it threatens to crush the
mother against the walls of the house. ° Here, she insists, we cannot say
that the mother "can do nothing, that [the mother] cannot attack it to
save [her] life .... .Her analysis rests on a right of self-defense that she
presumes is a universal value so fundamental that it can carry by slim
analogy.. a broad right to abortion. 13
In 1989, Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan argued, among other
things, that abortion was at the heart of constitutionally protected
choices because "few decisions can more importantly alter the course of
one's life than the decision to bring a child into the world. 2 4 The self-
203. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1020 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lilo T. Strauss et
al., Abortion Surveillance- United States, 2002, MMWR SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Nov. 2005, at 6,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss54o7ai.htm.
204. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v.
Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375,383 n.6i (1985) (citing Regan, supra note 199).
205. Johnson, supra note 12, at 102-09.
206. See id. at 11O-1 5 (critiquing Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, I PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 47 (1971)). Thomson's article preceded Regan's by nearly eight years. My colleagues in the social
sciences who witnessed the impact of her essay suggest that all similar arguments are derivative of
Thomson's. For example, Mane Hajdin, a Lecturer in Philosophy at Santa Clara University, expressed
such a view to me in conversation. My ordering of the articles here reflects the position of Regan's
article within the law review genre.
207. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 n.i20 (1992).
208. Thomson, supra note 206, at 48-50.
209. Id. at 52.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The analogy is slim because only a fraction of abortion cases present a threat to the life of the
mother. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
213. Johnson, supra note 12, at 110-15.
214. Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One,
138 U. PA. L. REV. I19, 127 (1989).
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defense choice presents obviously higher stakes. It is not the course of
one's life, but one's very existence that is at stake.
Estrich and Sullivan presented their arguments explicitly as an
appeal to Justice O'Connor, at the time the only woman on the Court."'
By 1992, Justice O'Connor stood with the majority in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, concluding that the
abortion right involves choices "central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [that] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. '21 6 Liberty, said the Court, includes more than those rights
already guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution."7
The Court further explained that the
full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the
freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms;
the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is fair then to consider the first eight Amendments -including a
right to arms now affirmed in Heller-as the foundation of liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The abortion right, plainly
unenumerated, may be harder to extract but still can be plausibly
inferred. The irony of the standard position is the suggestion that the
Constitution inferentially protects the abortion right, but not the gun
right that is rooted explicitly in the text.
Within the broader abortion/gun rights intersection, the comparison
between partial-birth abortion and assault weapons claims is apt, both
analytically and politically. From the view of the opposition, both assault
weapons and partial-birth abortion are extreme manifestations of the
contested right."9 Both are contrasted to other less controversial
manifestations of the broader right and those alternatives feed
arguments that the right can be respected without permitting these
especially aggressive, unnecessary, or unjustifiable renditions of it. As a
quantitative matter, both represent a fraction of what opponents object
215. Id. at 122-23.
216. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
217. Id. at 847.
218. Id. at 848 (emphasis added) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (196I) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
219. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 983 (2ooo) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("From
reading the majority's sanitized description, one would think that this case involves state regulation of
a widely accepted routine medical procedure. Nothing could be further from the truth. The most
widely used method of abortion during this stage of pregnancy is so gruesome that its use can be
traumatic even for the physicians and medical staff who perform it."); supra note 63.
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to.2 Both present a tragedy of competing interests-neither the mother
nor the self-defender wants to destroy another life-interest and each is
pushed by exigency to the decision. Both are vigorously defended by
supporters on the view that the constitutional protection is fragile and
that defeat in this limited context would not end the controversy, but just
embolden opponents who oppose the right absolutely."' Both demand
analysis that many people find repugnant-for example, the graphic
comparisons of late term abortion procedures or discussions of relative
wound ballistics between assault weapons and hunting rifles.
B. A RIGHT TO BETTER METHODOLOGIES FOR PRESERVING LIFE AND
HEALTH: STENBERG, GONZALES, AND THE ATTITUDINALIST CHALLENGE
Dissenting in Heller, Justice Breyer complained that the majority
failed to supply a standard of review for future cases.222 Ironically, on the
discrete question of assault weapons, Justice Breyer's majority opinion in
Stenberg provides an especially apt methodology for administering the
competing interests of the right-bearer and the state.
Stenberg involved a challenge to Nebraska's ban on the controversial
D&X abortion procedure, described by the statute as "partial birth
abortion." '23 The Court held the statute unconstitutional because it failed
to include an exception where the doctor judged the procedure necessary
to protect the life or health of the mother. 24 A very similar procedure,
D&E (which Justice Stevens argued is nearly indistinguishable from
D&X " ' remained legal, as did the full range of less controversial,
earlier-term abortion procedures. 6 So, just like the assault weapons case,
the Court already had recognized the core right (abortion) but now
wrestled with the right-bearer's claim to a particular controversial
variation.
Stenberg's protection of methodological variations best suited to
saving the life of the right-bearer extends smoothly to the assault
weapons question, and on several points actually applies more easily to
the assault weapons case. This raises for the Stenberg majority the
attitudinalist challenge. Is Stenberg advanced on a point of principle? If
so, then it should extend to the demonstrably easier case of assault
weapons. Perhaps, though, Stenberg just confirms the attitudinalist
proposition and is a predictable manifestation of the standard position-
unprincipled, political, a mere reflection of tribal allegiances. If so, then
220. See, e.g., supra notes 72, 203 and accompanying text.
221. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 170-74.
222. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2869 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
223. 530 U.S. at 921-22.
224. Id. at 937-38.
225. Id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 938 (majority opinion).
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the assault weapons claim, though stronger, will be denied the
protections Court liberals established for partial-birth abortion."7
As summarized in the Introduction, the Court treated the partial-
birth abortion question again in Gonzales v. Carhart.225 This time, Court
conservatives were in the majority and they predictably resurrected
several of the arguments from their dissents in Stenberg- arguments that
weaken Stenberg and diminish the support the assault weapons claim
draws from it."9 Gonzales, for example, gives the state more leeway to
restrict methodologies "necessary" to protect the life of the right-bearer,
where adequate alternatives are available.23 This and other arguments
advanced in Gonzales may ultimately expose Court conservatives to the
attitudinalist challenge.
Subsection i will elaborate the parallels between the assault
weapons and partial-birth abortion claims, apply the principles
developed by the Stenberg majority to the assault weapons claim, and
elaborate the attitudinalists' challenge that Stenberg poses for Court
liberals. Subsection 2 will focus on the dissenters' criticisms of Stenberg
to show how the parallel assault weapons question avoids those
objections and is thus the stronger claim. Subsection 3 will evaluate how
Gonzales, which diminishes Stenberg in key areas, raises the attitudinalist
challenge for Court conservatives.
i. Stenberg Principles and the Assault Weapons Intersection
Stenberg protects the right-bearer's access to marginally better
methods of abortion where her life or health is at stake . 3' This right to
"better" variations of the broadly protected right to abortion prevails in
the face of empirical dispute over whether the methodology really is
better,232 over empirical objections that it is actually worse (riskier),233
over objections that it cannot really be distinguished from other available
methodologies,"3 and over objections that the state's interest in
regulating the procedure is extraordinarily powerful, because it borders
227. Justice Breyer, for example, seems stuck with his commitment in Stenberg to robust
protection of even marginally better methods for exercising the contested right, where the life or
health of the right-bearer is on the line. But his dissent in Heller emphatically rejects this same
essential argument and advances instead the view that certain types of guns pose externalities (gun
crime) that justify banning the entire category (handguns, seemingly regardless of their defensive
utility), and not to worry because any individual right to arms is respected by allowing citizens to have
some type of gun. See 128 S. Ct. at 2863-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228. 127 S. Ct. 16io, 16i9 (2007).
229. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 958-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
230. 127 S. Ct. at 1638.
231. 530 U.S. at 929-30.
232. Id. at 933-37.
233. Id. at 933-35-
234. Id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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on infanticide.235 These positions and the principles that support them
transfer readily to the assault weapons question.
a. Protecting Best Methodologies for Preservation of Life and
Health
The Stenberg majority flatly rejects the assertion that the
constitutional right to abortion is adequately respected by the availability
of safe alternatives to the disputed D&X procedure. 36 Writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer makes plain that where the woman's life or
health is at stake, she is entitled to the superior abortion procedure.237
Even postviability, the government's interest in the life of the fetus must
give way to medical judgments that the procedure is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother. ,8
Stenberg's protection of better methodologies for exercising a core
constitutional right speaks squarely to the self-defender's parallel interest
in the best tool for particular categories of self-defense.39 Indeed, people
who cannot manage the weight or recoil of a heavier, more powerful gun,
or the dexterity demands of the handgun, 4' have a substantially different
and stronger claim. For them, the assault weapon may always be the
better alternative.
b. The Dispositive Empirical Question: Is the Disputed
Methodology Never the Best Option?
The empirical debate over whether D&X is ever the best alternative
for saving the life or health of the mother sharpens the core message of
Stenberg: If the state can show that the contested methodology is never
the best option for protecting life or health, then the partial-birth
abortion ban is permissible. 4' According to the majority, the State simply
235. Id. at 958-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult
or child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb.... Dr. Carhart ... testified [that] he
knows of a physician who removed the arm of a fetus only to have the fetus go on to be born 'as a
living child with one arm."' (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Ass'n of American Physicians &
Surgeons et al. as Amicus Curiae, Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914 (No. 99-830))).
236. Id. at 931-32 (majority opinion). Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783,
2860 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that dispute about the utility of the Washington, D.C.
handgun ban required deference to the legislature "because legislators, not judges, have primary
responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact"), with Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 970
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court fails to acknowledge substantial authority allowing the State to
take sides in a medical debate, even when fundamental liberty interests are at stake and even when
leading members of the profession disagree with the conclusions drawn by the legislature.").
237. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930-3 i .
238. Id.
239. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
240. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text. As discussed above, in the category of long
guns, the recoil and weight of the shotgun and many so-called "sporting rifles" exempted from the
1994 ban make them impractical for many smaller or weaker people. See supra notes 17O-71 and
accompanying text.
241. 530 U.S. at 937-38.
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failed on the factual showing.f2 On the view of at least some medical
experts, D&X "may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a
particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a
woman." '243 In the assault weapon context the state would face the
equivalent burden of showing that assault weapons are never the best
self-defense option. This is difficult first because of the regulatory
paradox (i.e., the claim of special externalities is also an admission of
special utility).2" Also the claimant's burden is comparatively easier
because assault weapon utility is easier to quantify than partial-birth
abortion utility.45 Partial-birth abortion utility is controversial because of
disputes between doctors that are in part subjective-a function of what
methodology particular doctors prefer."' Assertions of assault weapon
utility-lower recoil, less lethal ammunition-are grounded on less
contestable, objectively measurable physical characteristics. 47
Stenberg's "never the best option" filter also helps define the proper
scope of state regulation in a way that supplements Heller's common-use
test. The demand in at least some cases that the disputed methodology
be the superior option means that firearms that are always inferior and
which impose special externalities would not be protected. For example,
unreliable, inaccurate guns that areYrone to malfunctioning or injuring
the user, like the infamous zip gun' or the poorly identified "Saturday
Night Special," 49 might be banned on the argument that they are
universally inferior and often used by people who are prohibited from
having guns.5
242. Id. at 932 ("The State fails to demonstrate that banning D&X without a health exception may
not create significant health risks for women, because the record shows that significant medical
authority supports the proposition that in some circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure.").
But see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2387, 2852-53, 2860 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging
deference to the legislature).
243. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932 (quoting Carhart v. Stenberg, iI F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1126 (D. Neb.
1998)).
244. See supra Part II.B.
245. See supra Part II.B.i.
246. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (contending that by insisting on an
exception to the ban where the individual doctor makes a judgment that partial-birth abortion is
necessary, the majority "awards each physician a veto power over the State's judgment that the
procedures should not be performed").
247. See supra Part II.B.i.
248. Zip Gun, UrbanDictionary.com, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term-zip%2ogun
(last visited June 10, 2009) (defining "zip gun" as "a crude weapon made usually in someones [sic]
basement or garage").
249. See Dave Kopel, Second Amendment Project, Warren Burger and the Second Amendment,
http://davekopel.org/2AIMags/crburger.htm (last visited June io, 2009) ("So called 'Saturday Night
Specials' are small, inexpensive, low-calibre handguns, disdained by most criminals....").
250. The second point may be difficult to show empirically. Also, some will object that this critique
ignores the special utility of affordability-that it is not criminals but poor people who gravitate to
these guns. Compare odd and idiosyncratic guns like those disguised as writing instruments, canes, or
umbrellas that the ATF historically attempted to regulate more closely. See HALBROOK, supra note 37,
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c. Disputed Utility: Rarity
The State argued in Stenberg that the D&X procedure was not a
protected methodology because it was very rarely used. 5' Only a very
small fraction 52 of the million or so abortions per year are D&X
procedures.253 And only a fraction of that fraction involve a threat to the
life of the mother." The majority rejected this argument, ruling that a
burden on a particular methodology "unduly burden[s] the right to
choose abortion itself."'55 Rarity of the procedure, said Justice Breyer, "is
not highly relevant. ' ' 56 The deciding focus is those occasions that "could
strike anyone" where D&X is the best methodology.57 "[T]he State
cannot prohibit a person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing
out that most people do not need it." '
In the gun context, this answers the criticism that stormy days of
high assault weapons utility are thankfully rare. Rarity, Justice Breyer
emphasizes, "is not highly relevant." '59 The deciding factor is that assault
weapons exhibit special utilities in particular scenarios, "which could
strike anyone. ' '' 6 The state cannot deny right-bearers who require the
SMUs of assault weapons on the argument that "most people do not
need" them.61
Realize also that the rarity-parallel gains an extra feature in the
assault weapons case because the assault weapon is not just a stormy-day
tool. For smaller, weaker people, strength and dexterity requirements of
shotguns or handguns eliminate them entirely as alternatives."' For many
of those people, assault weapons might always be better self-defense
tools.
at 529.
251. 530 U.S. at 933.
252. The Stenberg Court noted that there is "no reliable data on the number of D&X abortions
performed annually. Estimates have ranged between 640 and 5,000 per year." Id. at 929.
253. Strauss et al., supra note 203, at I.
254. Id.
255. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930.
256. Id. at 934 ("[C]ertain of the arguments are beside the point. The D&X procedure's relative
rarity (argument (x)) is not highly relevant.").
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See id.
26o. See id. The comparative numbers for self-defense of course are contested. Compare Kleck &
Gertz, supra note 192, at 164 (finding that up to 2.5 million Americans use guns defensively each year),
with Philip J. Cook et al., The Gun Debate's New Mythical Number: How Many Defensive Uses Per
Year?, 16 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 463, 465 (1997) (estimating 1.5 million defensive gun users). In
most defensive gun uses, the gun is not actually discharged. KLECK, supra note 59, at 162. This suggests
that the appearance of the gun has substantial deterrent value. If this is right, the appearance of the
assault weapon-its nonsporting features -should have higher deterrent value than others.
261. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934.
262. See supra Part II.B.I.
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The Stenberg Court takes the point a step further, acknowledging
that rarity might reflect that D&X truly has no special utility.
' 3
Empirically there was strong evidence to support this, 64 but the dispute
was resolved in favor of the right-bearer.z65 So even if there is dispute
about stormy-day utility or whether assault weapons are a better choice
for people who cannot be proficient with other guns, Stenberg principles
dictate that plausible claims of SMU trump gun bans. Remember also the
state's dilemma. Unless the assault weapon does in fact have some
special utility, the initial decision to ban it is not even rational.' 66 But, says
Stenberg, once demonstrated, this utility, even if rarely accessed, trumps
the state's countervailing interest
67
d. Asserted Disutility: The Contested Methodology Imposes
Greater Risks than Available Alternatives
One contention in Stenberg was that the D&X procedure actuallX
posed a greater health risk to the mother than available alternatives
The district court rejected this claim on the evidence, 69 but the argument
opens a useful comparison to the assault weapons question. First of all,
no one has shown, and no facts suggest, that the assault weapon presents
a greater risk to the user than other types of firearms. On this point the
assault weapons claim is stronger.
Some will object that the proper question is whether the assault
weapon poses peculiar externalities-risks to the population at large. But
even loosening the analogy to accommodate that question, the argument
that the assault weapon poses greater risks does not survive the factual
inquiry. It is indisputable that the handgun inflicts exponentially greater
costs than the assault weapon. 7' Also, the typical assault weapon, which
by definition fires an intermediate cartridge, is ballistically inferior to
most deer rifles (many of which are semiautomatics),' so it actually
complements the state interest in limiting negative externalities.
263. 530 U.S. at 934.
264. See id. at 935.
265. Id. at 938.
266. See supra text accompanying note 137.
267. See supra text accompanying note 241.
268. 530 U.S. at 935.
269. Id. at 932.
270. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2856-59 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing extent of handgun violence); CHRISTOPHER S. KOPER ET AL., UNIV. OF PA., AN UPDATED
ASSESSMENT OF THE FEDERAL ASSAULT WEAPONS BAN: IMPACTS ON GUN MARKETS AND GUN VIOLENCE,
1994-2003, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/jerrylee/research/awexec2oo4.pdf
(noting that assault weapons were used in only a small fraction (2-8%) of gun crimes before the 1995
ban).
271. Ballistically it is difficult to sustain the argument that the assault weapon imposes more risk
than a "sporting" long gun, say in the .300 Magnum category, or one of the "approved
semiautomatics" from the last ban, like the Mi Garand. See supra Part I1.A.2.
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Finally, any argument that the assault weapon imposes special net
risks is difficult to sustain because the utilities and the externalities of all
firearms are just different sides of the same coin. The things that make
the assault weapon or any other gun useful for legitimate self-defense
become negative externalities where the gun is used for crime. The
assault weapons distinction rests on the implausible assertion that
particular features have personalities -with some features dedicated to
good and others committed to evil. The truth, of course, is that guns and
their features function the same way no matter who operates them. So if
the assault weapon has a distinct SMU, right-bearers generally will have
an interest in it that Stenberg says we must respect.
e. Disputed Utility: Erring for the Right-Bearer
Acknowledging the deep dispute over the utility of D&X, the
Stenberg majority protected the abortion right by resolving ambiguities
against the government. '72 The empirical case for D&X utility was so
deeply contested that the Court did not demand "absolute proof" of
SMU.273 "[U]nanimity of medical opinion" was not required, and the
Court resolved the "differences of medical opinion" about the utility of
D&X in favor of the mother in order to avoid "unnecessary risk of tragic
health consequences." '274 And if it turns out the Court is wrong about the
utility of D&X, said Justice Breyer, then that is a lesser harm because
"the exception will simply turn out to have been unnecessary."'75
The parallel assault weapons claim is clearer and easier to evaluate
because much of it is objectively measurable (i.e., weight, recoil, and
lower lethality). These factors weigh in favor of assault weapons
protection without resort to the Stenberg principle of erring for the right-
bearer. It is only in the context of the subjective SMUs (which are not
essential to establish the claim) that the assault weapons claim might
require Stenberg burden-shifting. And even on these subjective
measures, the assault weapons argument is stronger than the Stenberg
abortion claim.
Stenberg recites the deep divisions among experts about the utility of
D&X.27 6 Even though the American College of Obstetricians and
272. 530 U.S. at 937-38.
273. Id. at 936-37.
274. Id. at 937 ("[W]e cannot say that the presence of a different view by itself proves the
contrary."). In the assault weapons context, there are analogies, but they cut against the state claim,
either that assault weapons are a special enough threat that the state can impair the right in that
limited case, or that assault weapons have no special utility in selected strands of self-defense.
275. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Breyer offers this as if the abortion procedures do not really
present a problem. He really is saying that stepping on the constitutional right is more of a problem,
and the primary one, and that we will err in favor of the individual and protect the optimal
methodology, even where the state and many citizens find the procedure gruesome, even criminal.
276. Id.
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Gynecologists' report "could identify no circumstances under which
[D&X] would be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of
the woman," the Court protected the procedure on the authority of other
expert testimony."7 There is nothing close to this type of dispute about
the subjective SMUs of the assault weapon. Indeed, the assertion of
special externalities, and thus special utility, is what prompts assault
weapons regulation in the first place."8 However, even where the state
manages a plausible argument that assault weapons present more costs
than benefits,279 Stenberg resolves doubt in favor of the right-bearer. 8°
f. A Critique of Irrational Distinctions
Justice Breyer argues that the Nebraska statute does not really
further the state's asserted interest in the "potentiality" of human life-
that it is not geared to actually save any particular fetus from destruction
because it only affects a rare method of abortion and abortion by other
methods is freely available.' So the rationale for the partial-birth
abortion ban is illusory because abortion is a broadly protected
constitutional right that unquestionably could be exercised through
alternative means. Indeed, Justice Breyer contends that the D&X ban is
irrational because the statute makes it hard to distinguish between D&X
and the ostensibly legal D&E procedure 82 So even the interest in
avoiding destruction of the fetus through a particularly troublesome
methodology is not achieved. Justice Stevens's short concurrence puts
the argument bluntly: the Nebraska statute is not rational because there
is no reason to believe that the banned procedure is any "more brutal,
more gruesome, or less respectful of 'potential life"' than the permitted
procedure.3
277. Id. at 934 (quoting Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Executive Bd., Statement on
Intact Dilation and Extraction (Jan. 12, 1997)).
278. See generally Part II.B (explaining the regulatory paradox).
279. This claim requires the difficult showing that a gun's features are not neutral-that somehow
they are only accessible to criminals. The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence attempts this
argument, suggesting that assault weapons have some special capacity for shooting from the hip-
something criminals especially need to do. See BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra
note 82. David Hemenway makes a similar effort in a survey that questions whether owners of
semiautomatic firearms exhibit peculiar personality traits. See Hemenway & Richardson, supra note
76, at 286. He found that 6o% of gun owners had at least one automatic or semiautomatic firearm, and
that those people reported more frequent binge drinking. Id. at 287.
280. See 530 U.S. at 937-38.
281. Id. at 93o.
282. Id. at 938-39 ("We do not understand how one could distinguish, using [the statutory]
language, between D&E... and D&X....").
283. Id. at 946-47 (Stevens, J., concurring). Compare id. (describing as "irrational" the notion that
the state furthers any legitimate interest by banning one abortion method but not the other), with
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 16io, 1647 (2o07) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The law saves not a
single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion."). These arguments
parallel the broad claim that there is no distinction between the good guns and the bad guns in assault
weapons legislation, and thus the distinctions based on appearance are irrational.
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Here Justices Stevens and Breyer track almost exactly criticisms that
I and others leveled at the 1994 ban. I argued that banning the AR-15
and exempting the visually-distinct but functionally-equivalent Mini-14
was incoherent-that distinctions elevating appearance over function
were silly.i The assault weapons distinction is incoherent because
multiple other guns remain available, all of them are similarly deadly,
many of them are objectively more lethal than the assault weapon, and
an entire category of explicitly constitutionally protected guns
(handguns) account for the vast majority of gun crime.85 Tracking Justice
Stevens's Stenberg argument, how does a ban on semiautomatic guns
with pistol grips and folding stocks serve the state interest in limiting
firearms externalities when functionally identical and far more
destructive guns are explicitly permitted in the same legislation and are
otherwise constitutionally protected?
Ultimately we know that "assault weapon" is a political designation
that breathed life into the waning handgun prohibition movement and
was calculated to avoid the wrath of hunters by exempting millions of
more-lethal semiautomatic "sporting" guns 8 ' But this only makes the
earlier point another way. Semiautomatic guns are and long have been a
significant fraction of the inventory of civilian firearms."' Assault
weapons, distinguished primarily by appearance," are a functionally
indistinct and irrational classification.
g. Attitudinalism and the Cringe Factor
All of the Stenberg opinions, particularly the dissents, labor over the
particulars of the contested abortion procedures 89 Justices Thomas and
Kennedy both present the gruesome details almost as if the description
alone should settle things."l If the dispute really comes down to this, the
attitudinalist claim that passions trump principles is compelling.29 '
Justice Stevens also captures the essence of the armed self-defense decision in his summary of the
personal right of the woman "to make this difficult and extremely personal decision." Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 946 (Stevens, J., concurring). The self-defense claim is stronger of course because the
competing life interest is totally innocent in the abortion context and predominantly culpable in the
self-defense context. Also, the gun case is stronger because it is death or severe bodily harm in the
balance for the armed self-defender. In the abortion context, this is rarely the case. See supra notes
251-54 and accompanying text.
284. Johnson, supra note 65, at 442, 445.
285. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2855-56 (2oo8) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
286. See supra Parts I, II.A.2; see also Kopel, supra note 40, at i64-7o (comparing exempt
recreational firearms and assault weapons).
287. See supra Part II.A. i.
288. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 40, at 171-74.
289. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,958-6o (2ooo) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
290. See id. at 961 ("In light of the description of the D&X procedure, it should go without saying
that Nebraska's ban on partial birth abortion furthers purposes States are entitled to pursue."); id. at
983-89 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
291. One obvious explanation for the split in Stenberg is that, compared to the majority, the
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The Stenberg dissenters argue that even the technical, clinical
description of the disputed procedure is grotesque. 92 Even Justice Breyer
dissenters place a generally higher relative value on the fetus. Justice Kennedy, for example,
emphasizes testimony that D&X in some renditions is a hair's breadth away from infanticide. Id. at
958-59 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The life interest of the fetus is difficult to define. Stenberg discusses
the state's interest in the "potentiality of human life." Id. at 930 (majority opinion). This reflects that
the fetus is not a separate person, but is substantially more than nothing (some grieve over its loss). It
is more than just the idea of a life that might emerge. Whatever label we apply to it, it has happened, it
exists. But how far apart are these valuations and what else do they tell us? Only in context do we
approach an answer. Compare, then, Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Stenberg and his dissent in
Heller. Together they are a textbook illustration of the standard position and perhaps illuminate core
convictions that attitudinalists say really control these questions.
One explanation for the standard position is the relative valuation of life-interests. Both the
abortion right and the gun right threaten and ultimately consume competing life-interests: the gun
right through criminal homicides and legitimate self-defense shootings; the abortion right through
destroyed fetuses. One way to arrive at the standard position is to value the fetus as some fraction of a
life-in-being. So 1.3 million fetuses destroyed each year are weighted less than 13,ooo gun homicides.
See Johnson, supra note I, at 843; Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Roe versus Reality-Abortion
and Women's Health, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2006). On that measure, the standard position values
the fetus at about .oi of a life-in-being.
One might adopt the standard position on the view that the externalities of the gun right
weigh more heavily than those of the abortion right. But this is empirically problematic. It rests on the
highly contested assumption that firearms impose net social costs while the abortion right only causes
opponents and participants some existential angst. It means ignoring evidence that guns are used
widely for self-defense and that communities where trustworthy people are armed experience less
crime. See, e.g., JOHN R. LoTr JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL
LAWS 51 (1998); Kleck & Gertz, supra note 192, at t85. And that requires erring against the right-
claimant on a deeply contested empirical question-precisely the opposite of what Stenberg
commands. See supra Part III.B.i.e.
Another explanation is that the costs of the abortion right are private and predictable, while
the externalities of the gun right spin out at random. But this really collapses back into the fetus
valuation question. If we were balancing a life-in-being rather than a fetus, it would not be a privacy
issue at all. It would be just like the gun question, where it is no excuse that gun violence occurs in
private or between family members. The only difference in the abortion case is that the fetus depends
on the mother in a unique way, and in a contest between the two, that dependency lowers the
valuation of the fetus.
There is another superficially different explanation that, again, reduces to the valuation
question. It emphasizes the mother's autonomy and equality in a world where men and women are
both responsible for the pregnancy but women disproportionately bear the burden of caring for the
unwanted child. See Ginsburg, supra note 204, at 382-83. This transforms the question into a contest
between the man and woman who created the fetus. Equality means that the woman should have an
equivalent chance to avoid the burden of the unwanted child. It is interesting to compare this
argument with the militia-centric version of the Second Amendment that is advanced, for example, by
Justice Stevens's dissent in Heller. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2824-26 (2008)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Formal militia participation historically has been, and continues to be,
explicitly gender-discriminatory. See, e.g., to U.S.C. § 311 (2006) (identifying militia members as able
bodied males ages eighteen to forty-five, and female members of the national guard). This seems to be
an equal or plainer violation of the equality argument. This reduces to the valuation argument because
any value attached to the fetus is secondary to the woman's equality claim.
It is then difficult to escape the assessment that the standard position depends on a
comparatively low valuation of the fetus. Is it principle or passion that explains this valuation?
292. See, e.g., 530 U.S. at 983-89 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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acknowledges, "our discussion may seem ... horrifying."'2 93 The details of
the assault weapon ballistics argument will strike some people the same
way. Consider, for example, Dr. Martin Fackler's illustration of the
comparatively less lethal characteristics of the assault weapon projectile:
"[Assertions that assault weapon bullets are especially destructive] must
cause the thinking individual to ask:... how is it possible that twenty-
nine children and one teacher out of thirty-five hit in the Stockton
schoolyard survived... ?,294 Dr. Fackler's point is that assault weapons
fire an intermediate round "designed to limit tissue disruption-to
wound rather than kill.""29 One response is that this large number of
people would not have been shot but for the assault weapon. The
rebuttal unfortunately is that the unilaterally armed assailant is at no
practical disadvantage for having to top off or reload any of the other
common firearms technologies29 Defenseless people are no better off
whether their assailant is using a continuously reloadable shotgun, ioo-
year-old lever-action rifle, or a revolver that takes seconds to reload. 7
The broader point is that some may find this whole conversation as
repulsive as others find Justices Breyer's and Stevens's arguments that
D&X and D&E are so similarly grotesque that the state cannot rationally
discriminate between the two.29  One wonders whether principles,
constitutional or otherwise, can compete with the passions stirred by
questions.
293. Id. at 923 (majority opinion).
294. See Kopel, supra note 4o, at 169-7o (alteration in original).
295. Id. at 170.
296. In 1997, at Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi, a sixteen-year-old shot nine classmates
using a stolen single-shot deer rifle that "had to be reloaded after every shot." Wayne Laugesen, A
Principal and His Gun, BOULDER WKLY., Oct. 15, 1999, available at http://www.davekopel.com/2a/
othwr/principal&gun.htm.
297. Some of the worst outcomes of human violence are the result of extreme imbalances in access
to weapons technology. See, e.g., JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES 76 (1999) (describing massacres of native peoples by European invaders with guns). See
generally JAY SIMKIN ET AL., LETHAL LAWS (1994) (arguing that government-imposed gun control has
resulted in genocides). Smaller-scale examples are shootings like the Virginia Tech massacre. See
Christine Hauser & Anahad O'Connor, Virginia Tech Shooting Leaves 33 Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2o7/04/i6/us/i6cnd-shooting.html?_r= i&scp=I&sq=
virginia%2otech %2omassacre&st=cse.
298. I have long held the view that people react viscerally to the gun question and rarely change
their position absent some cathartic event. I have viewed this mainly as a cultural phenomenon. The
work of cognitive psychologists tracking the seats of different capabilities and emotions in the brain
suggests another possibility-that it might be hard-wiring as much as culture that guides how we
approach the gun question. Particularly interesting is the recognition that in our "reptile brain," the
cerebellum controls more basic and automatic functions. See generally DANIEL J. LEVmN, Tins is
YOUR BRAIN ON Music: THE SCIENCE OF A HUMAN OBSESSION (2O07), for a fascinating study of these
general ideas. Could it be that the revulsion and fear that people experience viewing just a picture of a
firearm keys into some hard-wired survival instinct? Or that the fascination others have with firearms
reflects a different version of the same thing? Perhaps thinking about private weapons is a largely
hard-wired response to perceived danger. See id.
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2. The Stenberg Dissents
There are, of course, distinctions between the ideas that ground
abortion and gun rights, but mainly those distinctions show that the
abortion right is on more tenuous footing.2" This subsection elaborates
those distinctions by reference to the dissenters' criticisms of the
Stenberg majority.
a. Kennedy in Dissent
i. Government's Countervailing Interest: Promoting
Respect for Human Life and the Impulse for
Irrational Assault Weapon Definitions
Justice Kennedy argues that the majority fails to respect Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in which the Court
validated the state's substantial countervailing interest in "promot[ing]
the life of the unborn and... ensur[ing] respect for all human life and its
potential '"3°" and combating things that cause society to become
"insensitive, even disdainful, to life..... Justice Kennedy's lament comes
closer to capturing the impulse for assault weapons bans than anything
offered in legislative preambles.3 2
Although assault weapon classifications make little sense
functionally, they do successfully stigmatize fighting tools. This explains
the typical exemptions for functionally identical guns (just as effective for
fighting) that by appearance seem more like sporting tools. I have
criticized this elevation of appearance over function as silly, but Justice
Kennedy's "insensitivity to life" theme evokes a symbolism that renders
assault weapon distinctions entirely understandable. A seminar student
several years ago gave voice to it. In a deeply emotional reaction to a
discussion of the irrational classifications in the 1994 ban, she said she did
299. See Johnson, supra note i2.
300. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 957 (20oo) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 961.
302. It is almost too easy to criticize assault weapons bans for the absurd focus on pistol grips,
bayonet lugs, and flash hiders that are irrelevant to function. Representative Carolyn McCarthy,
sponsor of a House bill to renew the 1994 ban, was embarrassed on national television when asked by
Tucker Carlson to explain what a barrel shroud was and why her bill proposed to ban them. See
Tucker (MSNBC television broadcast Apr. 18, 2007), available at http:/www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ospNRk2uM3U. Pressed, she admitted that she did not know what a barrel shroud was: her
guess was the sling or carrying strap. Id. Representative McCarthy ran for Congress after losing a
loved one to the gunfire of a madman who shot people randomly on a Long Island Railroad train.
Peter Marks, Train Shooting Victim Speaks for First Time Since Injury, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993,
available at http://
www.nytimes.com/1993/12/I5/nyregion/train-shooting-victim-speaks-for-first-time-sinceinjury.html.
Almost any reaction to that kind of trauma is understandable. But it is not just Representative
McCarthy who presses the view that oddly-defined assault weapons are illegitimate. See, e.g., Press
Release, Violence Policy Ctr., U.S. Can Act Immediately to Halt Import of AK-4 7 Assault Rifles
Fueling Gun Violence on U.S./Mexico Border, VPC Tells Congress (Mar. i8, 2009), available at
http://www.vpe.org/press/o9o3rand.htm.
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not want to be part of a society in which people owned assault weapons.
It was irrelevant to her that two guns would kill the same way, that they
were identical in function. It was vital to her that one gun by its
appearance seemed clearly "intended" only for fighting! There was
something wrong with a society that allowed such things and something
wrong with people who owned them. Her essential anguish tracked
Justice Kennedy's criticism. The appearance of the guns suggests we are
insensitive to the value of life. Ignoring the root political calculations,
this is the purest form of the impulse for assault weapons restrictions.
The answer to this is straightforward. Post-Heller, firearms for self-
defense against criminal attackers are at the core of the Second
Amendment right." The sporting-use designation, a key feature of
federal importation rules3 4 that seeped into general questions of firearms
legitimacy, is now just a vestige of the pre-Heller world. So while the
impulse to ban assault weapons is understandably rooted in the
symbolism of the sporting-use designation, Heller's protection of
ordinary self-defense guns nullifies the sporting use filter and places self-
defense utility at the center of the constitutional inquiry.35
Justice Kennedy argues that the state has an interest in declaring
critical moral differences between the permitted D&E and the restricted
D&X procedures."6 The state, he says, need not be indifferent to a
procedure that uses the natural delivery process to kill the fetus. 7 This is
a fair analogue to the argument that the state has an interest in
preventing citizens from defending themselves with guns that look like
weapons of war, and that "silly"'' 8 distinctions based on appearance
actually reflect important moral judgments.
One answer is that the distinctions used to classify some
semiautomatic guns as assault weapons are hardly perceptible and others
are nebulous. For example, one of the things necessary to make a
prohibited gun legal under the 1994 ban was swapping internal parts like
the foreign-trigger group for domestic ones.3" And for some people just
the color and constituent materials of the gun (black and synthetic versus
303. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008).
304. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(r) (2oo6).
305. The 1994 ban was grounded partly in the pre-Heller focus on "sporting use" to define
legitimacy. See Johnson, supra note io6, at 771-72. Post-Heller, with its explicit protection of arms
ordinarily used for self-defense, the sporting-use designation recedes to the margins.
3o6. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 964 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
307. Id.
3o8. See Johnson, supra note 65, at 445.
309. Domestic parts were manufactured for precisely this purpose. See Brownells.com, AK-47
Trigger Group, http://www.brownells.comL.aspx/pid=22875/Product/ (last visited June 1O, 2009)
("Drop-in replacement for factory trigger .... Made in the U.S.A. to keep your gun in compliance
with U.S. Code Title I8 Section 922(r) part-source requirements. Kit counts as three, U.S.-made
parts-trigger, disconnector, and hammer. Single and double hook models available.").
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wood and blued steel) may be the difference between sporting and
menacing."0 More broadly, in the context of the full inventory of
common firearms, the moral distinction is unsustainable. Is it plausible
that guns easily secreted on the person (i.e., handguns, all of which have
pistol grips) are morally superior to rifles with pistol grips? Are high-
powered rifles that can produce sure kills on human targets at hundreds
of yards (essentially every deer rifle ever made) morally superior to
lower-powered carbines with adjustable stocks (e.g., the AR-I 5 )? Why
are semiautomatic repeaters in intermediate calibers reprehensible but
high-caliber semiautomatic, pump-, or lever-action hunting guns, and
multi-projectile shotguns morally benign?
My emotional student's revulsion against the assault weapon is a
tenuous platform for building policy. But if assault weapons bans are to
be sustained, it is something like that revulsion that must be elevated to a
countervailing state interest. Compared to the state interest in the
partial-birth abortion case -restricting a procedure that borders on
infanticide-it seems quite trivial.
ii. Private Judgments and Public Morality
Justice Kennedy contends that the judgment of the doctor about the
necessity of D&X to preserve life or health of the mother puts a public
judgment into private hands-that "it is now Dr. Leroy Carhart who sets
abortion policy for the State of Nebraska, not the legislature or the
people. '' .. On a question steeped in "morality," Justice Kennedy says it
is wrong to make this an individual subjective decision.3"2
Contrast the assault weapons case where the mere assertion by the
right-bearer that a particular technology is better for him (the equivalent
of Justice Kennedy's complaint about Dr. Carhart) is only secondary
evidence of SMU. For assault weapons, the primary claim of SMU is
objective, based on distinctions in ballistics, recoil, and rate of fire that
are mechanical, repeatable, and precisely measurable.
iii. Rights on the Border of Legitimacy and the State
Interest at Its Peak
Justice Kennedy emphasizes that the disputed D&X procedure is
effective only when the fetus is nearly or actually viable, a point where
the state's interest in fetal life is nearing its peak and the woman's claim
is weakest." 3 He emphasizes Dr. Carhart's admission that he performs
310. See Alex Roth et al., New Calls for Assault-Gun Ban, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB12369o3147o9o138oi.htm (recounting the label "black guns" applied to
assault weapons).
311. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 965 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 964-65.
313. See id. at 968.
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D&X abortions even "when he is unsure whether the fetus is viable"3 4
and argues that dispatching the viable fetus through the prohibited D&X
procedure borders on infanticide because the abortion proceeds
essentially as a live birth until the fetus is destroyed."5 He argues
essentially that D&X is categorically different from other abortion
procedures.
The assault weapons question avoids this criticism. There is no
comparable argument that the assault weapon user is any different from
someone who has used a handgun or other unquestionably
constitutionally-protected gun in self-defense. It is the circumstances, not
the gun type, that determine whether the self-defense claim is legitimate.
On this measure, the assault weapons claim is stronger. D&X, and
arguably even the less controversial D&E procedure, produces a
qualitatively distinct type of destruction because the fetus has grown to
look more human, is perhaps viable outside the womb, and is destroyed
in a fashion where analogies like drawing and quartering seem fair.
A different argument is that the assault weapon in criminal hands
generates externalities qualitatively different from other guns in the
civilian inventory. The utility discussion above shows that while every
type of gun has its SMUs, the utility that imposes the highest
externalities is the concealability of handguns."6 Moreover, most assault
weapons are less lethal than deer rifles, and their multishot capability is
exceeded by the ubiquitous shotgun."7 The complaint about their
appearance reflects an uneasiness about making self-defense against
fellow citizens a central component of public policy. But now that Heller
has done just that, the objection to "nonsporting," overtly self-defensive
guns is unsustainable.
iv. Incorporating Substantial Countervailing Interests
Justice Kennedy argues that Stenberg violates Casey by establishing
a right to partial-birth abortion without any interference from the state.8
People will debate this construction, but it highlights an important point.
Casey acknowledged the substantial state interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy, declaring that "not all regulations must be
deemed unwarranted. '31 9
This prompts an instructive comparison with Heller, which broadly
affirms the state's interest in regulating firearms externalities. Heller says
314. Id. at 958.
315. Id. at 959-60.
316. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2387, 2856-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
317. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-67.
318. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 96o-6I (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1012 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (levying essentially the same criticism that by ceding authority to the physician to apply the
health exception, the majority mandates "unfettered abortion on demand").
319. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion).
June 20091
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
that most existing gun-control regulations remain valid, that laws
restricting access by felons and minors are not suspect, and that
functionally distinct guns like machine guns might not be protected." '
That the Court has limited Second Amendment protection to guns in
common use for lawful purposes like self-defense by definition denies
citizens access to substantially all of the military arsenal.3"' In this sense
Heller already endorses a broader range of government regulation than
Stenberg would tolerate in the abortion context. Under the logic of
Stenberg, essentially every type of abortion procedure is guaranteed if
deemed necessary to save the mother's life.322 Heller, on the other hand,
declares that only a narrow range of common firearms are guaranteed
under the Second Amendment, and that many people by their behavior
or their status can be denied even those.3
v. De Minimis Special Marginal Utilities
Justice Kennedy contends that the majority is "wrong to limit its
inquiry to the relative physical safety of the two procedures, with the
slightest potential difference requiring the invalidation of the law." '324 The
majority is straightforward about this. Alternatives to the D&X
procedure were found by the district court actually to be safe and
adequate, respecting at a reasonable level the woman's interest in having
a safe procedure.2 5 However, the prevailing argument was that the
prohibited procedure was safer than other safe ones.326 Women are
entitled to the better methodology, even where that means destruction of
the entirely innocent postviability fetus through a very problematic
methodology.3 7
The argument that the special utilities of assault weapons can be
adequately replaced by other constitutionally protected firearms is
essentially the same. Stenberg principles dictate that the state may not
ban assault weapons on the argument that alternate firearms exist, so
long as the assault weapon provides an advantage. On this point as well,
the assault weapons claim is comparatively stronger. There is substantial
dispute about the special utility of the D&X procedure, with competing
views plagued by subjective judgments." ' The assault weapons case, in
contrast, turns on verifiable physical characteristics already discussed.
320. 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
321. Id. at 2817.
322. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 961 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
323. 128 S. Ct. at 2816-17.
324. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 967 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas similarly argues that the
Stenberg health exception for procedures that have "any comparative health benefits" demands too
little. Id. at 1012 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
325. Id. at 914, 915 (majority opinion).
326. Id. at 928-29.
327. See id.
328. Id. at 926-29.
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vi. Letting the State Take Sides in Utility Disputes
Justice Kennedy criticizes the majority for ignoring precedent that in
other contexts permitted states to take sides on disputed medical
questions.329 In the assault weapons case, this principle would demand a
detailed evaluation and deference to the state where there is fair
disagreement about assault weapons' externalities. The showing would
focus on the objective evidence of functionality. Faked photo-ops and
wild assertions about super-destructive assault weapon bullets would
diminish the state's position."' And here, the interesting question is
whether Justice Kennedy would defer to credible state findings that
assault weapons impose important net externalities. Unwillingness to
defer would expose him to the attitudinalist critique.
b. Thomas in Dissent
i. Highlighting the Partial-Birth Abortion/Assault
Weapon Intersection
Justice Thomas argues that the Stenberg majority goes beyond what
is required to protect the mother's health.33 ' He contends that the
majority fails "to distinguish between cases in which health concerns
require a woman to obtain an abortion and cases in which health
concerns cause a woman who desires an abortion (for whatever reason)
to prefer one method over another." '332
This highlights the space where the abortion and gun claims intersect
and is another illustration of their relative strength. The Stenberg
abortion right is strongest-near absolute-where necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother. The mother is never required to
surrender her life to the state's interest in the life of the fetus.333 This is
pure abortion as self-defense claim in the style of Judith Thomson and
Donald Regan.334 But this self-defense analogy only covers the small
fraction of abortion claims where the mother's life is at stake. In contrast,
essentially every gun claim to the better methodology for self-defense
invokes the principle (controlling in Stenberg) that the state cannot
trump the right-bearer's interest in preserving her own life. So over a far
broader range of cases, the gun claim is covered by the strongest
rendition of Stenberg's protection of methodological alternatives.335
329. Id. at 971-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
330. Johnson, supra note IO6, at 792 n.427.
331. 530 U.S. at ioio (Thomas, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. See supra Part III.A.
334. See supra Part I1.A; see also Johnson, supra note 196, at 102-15 (critiquing the positions
advanced by Regan and Thomson).
335. Compare Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 980 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (making several other discrete
points that highlight the intersection, by summarizing the basic case that the abortion right is not
supported in the text of the Constitution), with Johnson, supra note 12, at 138-6o (weighing the textual
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ii. Tolerating Infringements at the Margin
Justice Thomas's criticism that the majority has overridden
important state interests to protect a marginal, even reprehensible,
abortion methodology highlights another important distinction that
makes assault weapons a stronger case under Stenberg principles than
partial-birth abortion."36 His first point is that this is not like Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, which outlawed a procedure
used in 70% of abortions after twelve weeks.337 His view of the Court's
abortion decisions is that banning a widely used methodology is
problematic, but infringements at the margin can be tolerated."'8
The gun parallel is evident. Under Justice Thomas's view, it would
be problematic to ban handguns because they are so widely used for self-
defense.339 The assault weapon, in contrast, is like the more rarely used
abortion methodologies. In principle, then, Justice Thomas's willingness
to tolerate infringements at the margin -on the view that the core right is
intact-should predict his response to an assault weapons ban. Is he
trapped by inconsistency if he votes to strike down an assault weapons
ban and rejects the argument that adequate alternative guns are
available?
The answer is in the details of his Stenberg dissent. Thomas invokes
Danforth to press the point that D&X is not only rarely used (it is only
considered in 5.5% of abortions that occur after fifteen weeks, the vast
majority of which are performed using the D&E alternative),3 40 but that
"[a] select committee of [the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists] 'could identify no circumstances under which this
procedure.., would be the only option.""'34 So, unlike the majority,
Justice Thomas concludes from the empirical debate that there is "no
basis upon which to state the claim that [partial-birth abortion] is a safer
or even a preferred procedure. 3 4 In his view, the SMUs of D&X is zero,
and its externalities (flirting with infanticide) are off the scale.43 In
claims for the abortion and gun rights), and Johnson, supra note 74, at 709-II (showing the right to
arms in 44 state constitutions). For Justice Thomas' discussion of the "partial-birth abortion" term that
tracks the criticisms that the legislature created the term "assault rifle" and the category in conflict
with conventional meaning, see Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1014 (Thomas, J., dissenting). His summary of
Casey, which he claims is undercut by Stenberg, includes a description of Casey's validation of a
twenty-four-hour waiting period. Id. This is a style of legislative proposal common in both the gun and
abortion context. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-8 0 (1992) (describing
exception to the waiting period where the life or health of the mother was at stake).
336. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1014 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
337. See 428 U.S. 52, 75-76 (1976).
338. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at r014 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
339. See, e.g., Kleck, supra note 192, at 185.
340. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 1os5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
341. Id.
342. Id. at io6.
343. Id. at 1020.
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contrast, the assault weapon claim presents strong objective evidence of
SMU. His answer, then, to the attitudinalist critique would be that there
is a broad empirical disanalogy favoring the assault weapons claim and
disfavoring partial-birth abortion. Even though they reside in similarly
contested space, on this point the greater SMUs of the assault weapon
makes the two claims very different cases.3"
3. Gonzales v. Carhart: Reflecting Back the Standard Position?
In 2007, Court conservatives upheld a federal partial-birth abortion
ban that distinguished and diminished Stenberg.345 In Gonzales v. Carhart,
the Court credited congressional findings that "intact D&E" (i.e., D&X)
is never the better methodology for preserving the life or health of the
mother.346 Gonzales exposes the conservative wing of the Court to the
attitudinalist critique. It reflects one leg of what I will call the "common
view" of conservatives (i.e., support for gun rights and disparagement of
abortion rights). While Heller nominally reflects the other leg, the better
and more instructive test of the attitudinalist proposition would be an
assault weapons case invoking the Stenberg principles that conservatives
opposed.347 However, that case still would not be as open and telling a
test of conservative attitudinalism as Stenberg is for Court liberals.
The reason is in the distinction that has been evident throughout this
critique. Gonzales underscores the conclusion that the common view
faces a far lighter burden of principle than the standard position. This is a
function of the factual distinctions between the partial-birth abortion and
assault weapons claims. Those distinctions are illustrated broadly by my
original assessment in Principles and Passions,"4' and more particularly
here. The discussion below will elaborate the relative burdens of the
standard position and the common view by emphasizing elements of the
assault weapons claim that make the common view easier to sustain as a
matter of principle.349
344. Kopel, supra note 38. The assault weapon presents SMUs in terms of ballistics and recoil that
can be measured to decimal places. See supra Part H. The assault weapon's lower lethality actually
complements the state interest in reducing externalities. See supra Part It. The significance of this
reduced lethality (and the arguable irrationality of a restriction that fails to account for it) should be
understood in contrast to the advanced lethality of guns expressly identified as legitimate (e.g., most
medium to large game hunting rifles in a variety of repeating technologies). See supra Part II.
345. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. r61o, 16i9 (2007).
346. Id. at 1644.
347. See supra Part n1I.B.2.a-b (discussing dissents of Justices Kennedy and Thomas, criticizing the
adequacy of a peppercorn of SMUs and protection of methodologies rarely necessary to protect life or
health).
348. Johnson, supra note 12.
349. I do not claim that this would satisfy the attidudinalist who might always dismiss articulated
principles as just byplay or "worse than useless" bunk. See Dorf, supra note 22, at 500.
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a. Partial-Birth Abortion as a Transformative Methodology
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy suggests partial-birth
abortion is an appropriate object of legislative attention because it is a
qualitatively different, indeed transformative, methodology.30 The D&X
procedure is distinct even from D&E because the relative similarity of
D&X to the actual birth process transforms it from a legitimate abortion
procedure into something just short of assault on a human child.
Nothing about the assault weapon, or using assault weapons for self-
defense, is similarly transformative. The assault weapon is a gun, like
other guns. It is deadly, like other guns. But it is demonstrably not the
most dangerous gun in the inventory of common firearms."' It does not
impact targets in a different, somehow more reprehensible way.
Legitimate acts of self-defense are not rendered illegitimate because the
defender uses an AR-15 instead of a handgun. So unlike partial-birth
abortion, on this test of legitimacy, the assault weapon survives.
b. Disputed Utility and Legislative Discretion
Integral to the outcome in Gonzales is the majority's willingness to
credit the legislature's judgment that there is overriding evidence of
disutility: the contested statute was grounded on a congressional finding
that partial-birth abortion is never the best methodology for preservation
of the life or health of the mother. 2 Justice Kennedy dissented in
Stenberg that legislatures should be permitted to take sides in this
fashion. 53 Gonzales enforces that view. Acknowledging the dispute about
the utility of D&X, the majority finds the case close enough to defer to
Congress:354
There is documented medical disagreement whether the Act's
prohibition would ever impose significant health risks on women....
The question becomes whether the Act can stand when this medical
uncertainty persists. The Court's precedents instruct that the Act can
survive this facial attack. The Court has given state and federal
350. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1634-35 ("Partial-birth abortion, as defined by the Act, differs
from a standard D&E because the former occurs when the fetus is partially outside the mother to the
point of one of the Act's anatomical landmarks."); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1006-o7
(2ooo) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The [American Medical Association] has recognized that this
procedure is 'ethically different from other destructive abortion techniques because the fetus,
normally twenty weeks or longer in gestation, is killed outside the womb. The "partial birth" gives the
fetus an autonomy which separates it from the right of the woman to choose treatments for her own
body."' (quoting Brief for Ass'n of American Physicians & Surgeons et al., supra note 235)).
351. See Kopel, supra note 40, at 164-67.
352. 127 S. Ct. at 1624.
353. See 530 U.S. at 971-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
354. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1637 ("On the one hand, the Attorney General urges us to uphold the
Act on the basis of the congressional findings alone. Although we review congressional fact-finding
under a deferential standard, we do not in the circumstances here place dispositive weight on
Congress' findings. The Court retains an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings
where constitutional rights are at stake." (citation omitted)).
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legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
medical and scientific uncertainty....
Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative
power in the abortion context any more than it does in other
contexts....
The conclusion that the Act does not impose an undue burden is
supported by other considerations. Alternatives [for example, D&E]
are available to the prohibited procedure....
... Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks,
are within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational
and in pursuit of legitimate ends.355
The Court does not entirely credit the congressional assessment."'
But it does find the state interest sufficient to trump the essentially de
minimis assertions of partial-birth abortion special utility.357 This
explicitly undercuts Stenberg and, more importantly for our purposes,
exposes the Gonzales majority""s to the attitudinalist critique. So would
the Gonzales majority defer to legislative findings that assault weapons
have no SMUs or are never the better self-defense option? If not, would
they simply be indulging the common view of the right? Or can such a
decision be justified as a matter of principle? This dilemma is structurally
parallel to that afflicting Court liberals, but quantitatively it is quite
different.
First, the deference in Gonzales is in the context of doctors'
subjective preferences for competing medical procedures."9 In contrast,
the assault weapons question is more plainly a matter of measurable
physical differences. In terms of functional utility, there is far less room
to establish a parallel empirical disagreement about the assault weapon.
For example, the core measurable utility of intermediate ballistics is
indisputable."'
Still, the emphasis on the wide discretion the Court has permitted
legislatures on questions of disputed medical utility361 poses for the
Gonzales majority a threshold burden of principle in the assessment of
subsequent assault weapons bans. Justices who in Gonzales endorsed
355. Id. at 1636-38 (citations omitted).
356. Id. at 1637-38.
357. Id. at 1638-39.
358. The Gonzales majority was made up of the same five Justices who voted in the Heller
majority.
359. See supra Part III.B.2.b (noting that the entire utility is grounded in conflicting testimony by
medical experts about the usefulness of D&X to the abortion doctor).
360. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 40, at 168-69.
361. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
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deference to the legislature on disputed medical questions must take
pains to show that the assault weapons claim is not exposed to the same
type of subjective empirical dispute-that assault weapon SMUs are
objectively measurable and that distinct assault weapons features will
operate both as SMUs or externalities purely depending on the user. 62
These distinctions are more than plausible but present a difference of
degree, not substance. Committed attitudinalists still might say it is all
just a smokescreen for conservatives advancing the common view.
c. Dominant Methodologies and Methodological Alternatives
Like Stenberg, Gonzales affirms that a broad ban on dominant
methodologies for exercising the protected right would be
unconstitutional.363 But unlike Stenberg, Gonzales permits limitations on
rarely-used methodologies where good alternatives are available. 
6
,
Extending that principle to the gun case, a sweeping handgun ban should
be treated the same as a sweeping early-term-abortion ban. Both statutes
should be struck down because they prohibit the dominant methodology
for exercising the protected right. The assault weapon, however, is like
the D&X procedure under Gonzales-a less common methodology that
has substitutes -with an important difference. For some people, the light
recoil from the intermediate cartridge makes the assault weapon always
the best self-defense tool.' 6' This showing would remove the "available
alternatives" element that justified the infringement on marginal
362. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing the regulatory paradox).
363. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 637.
364. Id.
The instant cases, then, are different from Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, in which the Court invalidated a ban on saline amniocentesis, the then-dominant
second-trimester abortion method. The Court found the ban in Danforth to be "an
unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having the effect of inhibiting,
the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks." Here the Act allows, among other
means, a commonly used and generally accepted method, so it does not construct a
substantial obstacle to the abortion right.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (976)).
365. David Kopel puts the point in human terms:
One evening, a gang brawl broke out in the street next to the northwest Denver home of
a young woman named Sharon Deatherage. A police car happened upon the scene, and
sped away without taking any action, never to return. As a result of this experience, the
young woman, who lived alone, decided that she would have to take measures to protect
herself because she could not rely on the Denver City government for protection. Because
of an injury to her wrist, she was unable to use a handgun. At the suggestion of a firearms
instructor, she bought an M-i carbine, which is a relatively small, low-powered
semiautomatic rifle, and which has been commercially available for nearly half a century.
Not long after she bought the weapon, the City of Denver turned Ms. Deatherage into a
criminal by declaring her M-i carbine and its attached 3o-round ammunition magazine an
illegal "assault weapon."
Kopel, supra note 38, at 381 (footnote omitted). As the example illustrates, someone who wants a gun
for self-defense but is physically unable to use a handgun must choose another suitable gun. The M-i
carbine assault rifle is perhaps the lowest-recoiling gun firing a cartridge still suitable for self-defense,
making it and other low-recoil assault weapons the best available option for self-defense. Id.
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methodologies in Gonzales.366 It also would provide cover to the
conservative wing of the Court in a subsequent assault weapons case that
had to explain why infringement on marginal methodologies was
acceptable in the abortion context (Gonzales) but not in the gun case. As
legal distinctions go, it seems fair. Whether it would satisfy the
committed attitudinalist is a tougher question.
d. Rejecting Physicians' Subjective Valuations
Justice Kennedy dissented in Stenberg that the majority turned
individual doctors into arbiters of community morality.367 Gonzales gives
that objection constitutional effect: "The law need not give abortion
doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice, nor
should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical
community."' ' Furthermore, "[w]hen standard medical options are
available, mere convenience does not suffice to displace them; and if
some procedures have different risks than others, it does not follow that
the State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable regulations.
'6
So the preferences of individual doctors will not be dispositive on the
question of methodological utility.
The assault weapons comparison yields two separate points.
Throughout the discussion of Stenberg, I have emphasized that assertions
of partial-birth abortion utility were primarily subjective (grounded in
the surgical preferences of particular doctors) while the primary SMUs of
the assault weapon were objectively measurable.37 ° However, as discussed
above, the assault weapon presents a variety of "subjective" SMUs as
well.37" ' Conceivably, one or more of those factors might be central to a
particular aspect of a future assault weapons dispute. In a case like that,
Justice Kennedy's treatment of subjective SMU claims would invite an
attitudinalist challenge.
e. Disputed Utility and Facial Attacks
Justice Kennedy explains that the questionable utility of partial-birth
abortion, supplemented by the congressional finding that it is never the
best alternative, makes the statute particularly unsuited to facial attack.37
The problem is better suited to an as-applied challenge:
The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman's
health, given the availability of other abortion procedures that are
considered to be safe alternatives.
366. 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
367. See 530 U.S. 914, 964 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
368. 127 S. Ct. at 1636.
369. Id. at 1638.
370. See discussion supra Part II.B.i.
371. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
372. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1624, 1636.
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The considerations we have discussed support our further
determination that these facial attacks should not have been
entertained in the first instance. In these circumstances the proper
means to consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge.373
This view imposes a substantial burden of principle on Court
conservatives. It is not at all clear that the quantitative differences
between the partial-birth abortion and assault weapons claims dictate a
different outcome on the facial challenge question. So a subsequent
facial attack on assault weapons legislation would be telling. Justice
Kennedy's suggestion that an as-applied challenge gives the Court a
better opportunity to quantify and balance utility and risk is easily
applicable to the assault weapons question. But broadly speaking this is
always the case. So there still is room to answer that the facial challenge
comparison really is not close, as shown by comparing the respective
claims of special utility.
37 4
Evaluation of assault weapons under the abortion standard for facial
challenges is complicated by the Court's failure to articulate a precise
standard. The Gonzales majority explains, "What [the facial challenge]
burden consists of in the specific context of abortion statutes has been a
subject of some question. We need not resolve that debate.""37 Justice
Kennedy acknowledges two possible views: that a facial challenge to an
abortion statute "must show that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid," ' 6 or that the legislation would be
"unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases." '377
So a facial challenge in the equivalent assault weapons case might
require a showing that no set of circumstances exists under which the ban
would be valid. This is an extremely demanding standard that, taken
literally, seems to credit almost any scenario the government can
articulate. So even though assault weapons claimants might make
powerful arguments that a facial challenge to an assault weapons ban is a
far stronger case, a facial challenge sustained by conservatives still would
373. Id. at 1638.
The Government has acknowledged that preenforcement, as-applied challenges to the Act
can be maintained. This is the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be
shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to
occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used. In an as-applied
challenge the nature of the medical risk can be better quantified and balanced than in a
facial attack.
Id. at 1638-39 (citation omitted).
374. This comparison pits the strong argument, that partial-birth abortion is never the best
alternative, against the assault weapon's objectively measurable SMUs and assault weapons bans'
irrational attribution of dangerous qualities to features that only affect appearance.
375. 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (citation omitted).
376. Id.
377. Id.
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invite the strong attitudinalist challenge of unprincipled capitulation to
the conservative common view.
On the second, weaker standard, Justice Kennedy argues in
Gonzales that respondents failed to demonstrate that the ban would be
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases."78 On that measure
the assault weapons claim is dramatically stronger, and this underscores a
distinction I have made throughout. The strongest arguments in favor of
abortion (i.e., abortion as self-defense)379 only cover a very narrow slice
of all abortions (because most pregnancies do not threaten the life of the
mother)."8' In contrast, nearly every assault weapons claim can fairly
assert the right-bearer's entitlement to the SMUs necessary to defend life
against wrongful aggressors. Here, the assault weapons claim is
sufficiently distinct and compelling that the Court might consider the
assault weapons question facially, without the criticism of unprincipled
capitulation to the common view.
CONCLUSION
One can on a principled basis elevate the state's interest above the
individual's interest on questions of self-defense and abortion. One can
on a principled basis subordinate the state's interest in both. One can on
a principled basis elevate the gun right but not the abortion right
(because the competing life-interest in the abortion context is entirely
innocent and in only a fraction of cases is the mother's life at stake, while
the right-bearer's life is always at stake in the self-defense case). But a
principled argument has yet to be made for elevating the abortion right
but subordinating the gun right. Attitudinalists tell us it is folly to expect
adherence to principle on such matters. If and when an assault weapons
case reaches the Supreme Court, it will be an important test of whether
the attitudinalists are correct.
378. Id. ("We note that the statute here applies to all instances in which the doctor proposes to use
the prohibited procedure, not merely those in which the woman suffers from medical complications.").
379. See supra Part III.A.
380. See Jeani Chang et al., Pregnancy-Related Mortality Surveillance -United States, z99i-999,
MMWR SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES, Feb. 2003, at I, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ss52o2ai.htm.
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